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Current History

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SEPTEMBER, 1977

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Current History

SEPTEMBER, 1977

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In this issue, seven articles explore changing political, military and economic conditions in China since the death of Mao Tse-tung and the defeat of the "Gang of Four." Our introductory article states that in China today, a "less 'revolutionary' Sinocommunism is . . . in the process of formulation. . . . And the present prospect is that the People's Republic of China, operating on the basis of a reinterpreted and revised Maoist communism, will by the year 2000 have come close to achieving its goal: to be 'a powerful modern socialist state' in political, economic and military terms."

China After Mao

BY O. EDMUND CLUBB

United States Foreign Service Officer, Retired

IN recent years, in the People's Republic of China (PRC), tensions grew between the "two lines," defined by the Maoist leadership as the "revolutionary" (radical) and "revisionist" (moderate) lines. Chairman Mao Tse-tung himself was in truth the very embodiment of the "two lines," on some occasions pragmatic to the core but in other situations the revolutionary extremist. In the decade 1966-1975, Mao and his radical disciples emphasized the doctrines of "class struggle" and "uninterrupted revolution" to overcome "bourgeois" tendencies. To counter the opposition some of his visionary projects generated within the party hierarchy, Mao sanctioned the concepts that "to revolt is good" and that majority decisions might be challenged. Did this mean attacking the source of authority, the party leadership? Of course: an operative slogan during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was "bombard the headquarters," later given milder form as "going against the tide." Mao finally made it categorical: the "class struggle" should be waged ultimately against "the bourgeoisie within the party."

Even so, master tactician Premier Chou En-lai seemed to have made provision at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) of 1975 for an orderly succession in the party leadership and for China's reasonably secure advance to a position of wealth and power by the end of the century. But when Chou En-lai died in January, 1976, it was not pragmatic Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing but the little-known Hua Kuo-feng who

succeeded to effective power as Acting Premier. Teng was purged in April as a "capitalist-roader," as other Old Comrades had been purged before him.

In the final major expression of his impatient revolutionism, Mao Tse-tung had wrecked Chou En-lai's carefully laid succession plans.¹ And Mao's radical followers had won a battle. In the months that followed, the party's radical faction campaigned against "capitalist-roaders" as a political breed and against Teng Hsiao-p'ing in particular.

But if Teng had been forced from power, other moderates remained. The struggle between the "two lines" had not been resolved; it had been aggravated. When Chairman Mao Tse-tung died on September 9, 1976, he left a legacy of towering accomplishments, along with a legacy of weakened political institutions, party disunity, factionalism in government and out and economic weaknesses. The economic situation was worse than had been publicly reported: with the radicals stressing politics at the expense of production, economic dislocations were common, and labor discontent was widespread. In the political field, factionalism in the leadership was attended by widespread undiscipline in the population. By his interminable "movements" aimed at the creation of a perfect society, Mao had alienated many Chinese from the "revolutionaries" who acted in his name; the opposition of pragmatic elements in the party, the army, and government hierarchies had consequently crystallized. Mao had not changed political man: there was still in being the primordial urge to power. Far from welding a consensus, in his later years he had fostered a division that would work against the radicals.

The official announcement of his death hailed Mao as "the founder and wise leader" of the party. It made

¹See, in this general connection, Lucien W. Pye, "China After Chou En-lai," *Current History*, September, 1976, pp. 53ff.

due reference to "his scientific conclusion that the bourgeoisie is right in the Communist party," and held that it was necessary to "persist in taking the class struggle as the key link." The projected policy line was in a recent pattern:

We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and consolidate the great unity of the people . . . under the leadership of the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, continue the struggle to repulse the right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, consolidate and develop the victories of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution²

But both the radicals and the moderates had been maneuvering and gathering their forces since April, and the anticipated political collision was now imminent.

The official funeral service was held on September 18 in T'ien An Men Square, with an estimated audience of one million people. First Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen presided over the ceremonies, but the funeral oration was delivered by Hua Kuo-feng, who had become Premier in April. In the light of subsequent events, there was a special significance in Hua's quotation of one of Mao Tse-tung's famous "directives" that identified "the three do's and the three don'ts": "Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire." In late September, there was renewed effort to continue the campaign against Teng Hsiao-p'ing and "the capitalist-roaders" in the party. But there were opposing calls for unity and production, and the radical drive faltered.

When Wang Hung-wen had been precipitously elevated to the position of Vice Chairman in 1973, it appeared that Mao had probably anointed him as successor to the exalted position of Chairman. By a Politburo decision of October 7, 1976, however, Premier Hua Kuo-feng was appointed Chairman to succeed Mao Tse-tung. That action was a clear portent that the radical faction was threatened with defeat. First announced by wallposters soon after the event, Hua's ascent to power was confirmed by an official spokesman at Peking on October 12. As party Chairman, by virtue of the 1975 state constitution, Hua commanded the Chinese armed forces. In the same promotion process, he had been designated chairman of the party's Military Affairs Commission. He thus occupied more positions

²*The New York Times*, September 10, 1976.

³*People's Daily* (Peking), December 16, quoted by *Le Monde* (Paris), December 19-20, 1976.

⁴For an interesting, circumstantial but detailed account of the actions of the radical faction, based on poster material, see Ross H. Munro (*Globe and Mail*, Toronto), *The New York Times*, November 9, 1976. According to this version, it would appear that the radicals in Shanghai were caught off-guard by the arrest of their leaders in Peking.

⁵"The Crux of the 'Gang of Four's' Crimes Is to Usurp Party and State Power," translation in *Peking Review*, January 7, 1977, pp. 29-32.

of political power than had Mao Tse-tung — not to mention Chou En-lai.

That he was actually stronger than either of his predecessors, however, remained to be proved. What was the nature of his support? A sign was soon forthcoming. In one short month, beginning on October 29, the Army organ *Liberation Army Daily* carried five editorials urging full support for the new Chairman. The upper military hierarchy was behind Hua Kuo-feng.

The factional confrontation that had been in the making since Chou's death now had a violent dénouement. On the same October 7 that Hua became Chairman, four Politburo members were arrested. All four had been viewed as Mao protégés, and all had been outstanding advocates of radical Maoism. They were: Deputy Premier Wang Hung-wen, Director of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Political Department Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, journalist-ideologue Yao Wen-yuan, and Mao's widow, Chiang Ch'ing, the radical leader who, in the past turbulent decade, had played a dominant role in Chinese art and culture. In that role, by her savage attacks on so-called "rightists" in the party, army and government, she had made many enemies — as had her three cohorts.

THE GANG OF FOUR PLOT

On October 21, on the occasion of a mass rally held in Peking, the New China News Agency (NCNA) officially confirmed Hua's promotion to the post of party Chairman and proclaimed the smashing of a plot to seize power by the "Gang of Four." There had been an earlier charge against the Four, namely, that in furtherance of their power plans, they had tampered with some "last words" of Chairman Mao, "act in line with past principles," changing the words to, "act according to the principles laid down," to suggest that it was *they* who were to exercise control after Mao's death. That esoteric change, of course, would hardly seem to qualify as high crime; but it was soon alleged that the Four had planned the assassination of Hua Kuo-feng and other leading personalities,³ and that, after their arrest on October 7, their supporters in Shanghai had moved to mobilize the local militia to resist the Peking authority.⁴

In an editorial of December '22, the *People's Daily* explained the essence of the semi-official charges against the vanquished.⁵ The editor(s) held that the crux of the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao anti-party Gang of Four's counter-revolutionary crimes was their "complete betrayal" of Chairman Mao's principle of "three do's and three don'ts" and "their practice of revisionism, their creation of splits and their intrigues and conspiracies in a vain attempt to usurp supreme party and state power, establish a fascist dictatorial regime and achieve their ultimate aim of restoring capitalism."

The editorial went on to confirm that, after the death of Chou, it was Mao Tse-tung who, in January,

1976, proposed that Hua Kuo-feng should be made Acting Premier and put in charge of the work of the Politburo. It was Mao who "decided" in April that Hua should be appointed First Vice-Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and thus "explicitly" designated Hua as his successor. With the death of Mao, the editorial charged, the Four swung into action—only to be defeated by the Central Committee headed by Hua. "Just what is this gang of four?" the editorial asked, and it gave the official answer: "It is a bunch of counter-revolutionaries who sneaked into our revolutionary ranks." As for Hua Kuo-feng, "He is the worthy wise leader of our party and of the people of our country."

The Peking media, under new controls, carried a wide variety of charges against the Four, including capitulationism, treason and, as for Wang Hung-wen, damnation as a "new bourgeois."⁶ Ironically, the charges faithfully reflected Maoist orthodoxy and the radical propaganda of recent years; it was only that the Four, who had engaged so assiduously in campaigning against others as "capitalist-roaders," had now themselves become the vilified targets of an ostensibly "anti-rightist" campaign.

But the most significant charge, indicative of the future policy line of the victorious moderates, was the allegation that the Four had conspired to thwart the nation's program of socialist modernization. Mao Tse-tung had said, in 1949, that it was necessary "steadily to transform China from an agricultural into an industrial country and to build China into a great socialist state." The Four, however, had allegedly opposed that program, believing that modernization would mean the restoration of capitalism. And there was more to it than that:

The "gang of four" used disrupting production as an important means to undermine the revolution. . . . They and their lackeys proclaimed among themselves: . . . "When production breaks down in a factory, it means another noose around the neck of those in power," and "Let the state bear the loss, blame those in power and we'll succeed in seizing power for ourselves." They thus completely revealed their sinister design.⁷

AN EXTENSIVE PURGE

The purge was not limited to the Four: it was the occasion, professedly, for ridding the party and the government of prominent members of the condemned faction. It was also a time for settling old accounts; if the

Chinese regularly urged the use of "tit-for-tat" tactics in foreign relations, they employ those same tactics at home. A nephew of Mao's, Mao Yuan-hsin, a divisional commander at Shenyang, was arrested, charged with having moved to throw his troops into action in connection with the radicals' projected coup d'état. So were some 30 other officials around the country. Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, an oldtime associate of Chou En-lai's, was replaced by Huang Hua, also of the Chou camp.

Various changes in personnel for provisional posts were announced progressively. The radical stronghold, Shanghai, received early and vigorous remedial attention. There was a broad purge in Fukien, where some 12,000 troops were deployed, by order of Premier Hua, to contain the disorder. The relevant news item gave an explanation: "Observers attributed the regional troubles largely to 'moderate' provincial administrators taking the opportunity to purge leftists who had attacked them in the past."⁸

There were troubles in other provinces, with those in Szechwan and Shansi taking on important dimensions. There was disorder at Paoting, some 100 miles south of Peking, put down only by action of the armed forces, again acting by Hua's orders. On November 28, an editorial in the *People's Daily* urged restraint in the campaign against the Four, citing Mao's dictum: "Cure the sickness to cure the patient." But if the authorities were trying to limit the application of the purge in order to maintain control over it, the elimination process was nevertheless to be methodical and far-reaching. And on occasion offenders were executed.

As a critical feature of the succession process, the issue of responsibility is naturally complex. It would appear, however, that the radicals worked strenuously after the death of Chou to strengthen their power position in anticipation of the upcoming confrontation with the moderates and that their actions often did not conform to "socialist legality." The pattern of events supported the conclusion that, either in confidence or in desperation, the radicals had waged a sustained campaign to win political power.⁹ But their cause was lost by Hua's coup, which deprived them of their leadership. The purge then proceeded progressively, under control from Peking, without encountering further serious opposition.

A NEW POLICY

The nationwide campaign against the defeated radicals constituted a backdrop for the formulation, in a series of official statements, of new policy lines. Speaking at the second national conference on Tachai on December 25, Hua Kuo-feng laid down four major tasks for the nation in the year ahead: to intensify the mass movement to expose and criticize the Gang of Four ("the central task for 1977"); to strengthen construction of the party; to intensify the mass movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture and from Taching

⁶See Alain Jacob, *Le Monde*, April 29, 1977.

⁷Chi Wei, "How the 'Gang of Four' Opposed Socialist Modernization," *Peking Review*, March 11, 1977, pp. 6-9.

⁸*The New York Times*, November 29, 1976. But the *People's Daily* shortly afterward reported that the Fukien troubles had been caused by factionalism and sabotage undertaken by the Gang of Four. *Ibid.*, December 5, 1976.

⁹See in this connection Martin Woollacott, "Massive Chinese Purge Foreseen," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, January 9; also Alain Jacob, *Le Monde*, January 4, 1977.

in industry; and to expand the mass movement to study the theoretical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Chairman Mao.¹⁰

CONDEMNING THE FOUR

As regards the Gang of Four, Hua issued a sweeping condemnation: "They are ultra-rightists, out-and-out capitalist-roaders and the most ferocious counter-revolutionaries. What 'leftists'! What 'radicals'! They could not have pursued a line farther to the right!" More particularly, he charged that the Four "were linked with Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang reactionaries in a thousand and one ways." Hua described the contradiction with the Gang as "one between ourselves and the enemy." In Maoist terms, this signified that there was to be no compromise: one or the other of the antagonists was to be eliminated from the political scene. By that approach, Hua manifestly proposed to consolidate his power and the authority of his faction.

For party building, Hua contended that it was necessary to effect a Marxist ideological education movement throughout the party, "centering on the strengthening of the party's unified leadership and democratic centralism and the promotion of its fine style of work, so as to build up our party well." The result of that educational movement, for party members, would be that

they will understand the fundamental principle that the party is founded for public interests, that the interests of the party and the people are above everything else and that ganging up for private interests is not allowed; they will understand the party rule that forbids the formation of any faction or secret group within the party; they will understand the importance of unified party leadership and party discipline and the harm of anarchism; they will understand that party members must uphold the proletarian party spirit and oppose bourgeois factionalism; they will understand that party members must abide by the basic principles of "three do's and three don'ts" and meet the five basic requirements set in the party constitution.

And Chairman Hua cited Chairman Mao's statement of principles set forth at the time of an intra-party dispute in 1935:

We must affirm anew the discipline of the party, namely: (1) the individual is subordinate to the organization; (2) the minority is subordinate to the majority; (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and (4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.

That seemed to sum it up. "Bombarding the headquarters" was henceforth out.

In developing his third precept, learning from Tachai in agriculture and Taching in industry, Hua asserted that "It is one of the fundamental tasks for the dictatorship of the proletariat to develop the socialist economy

energetically." And in treating the thesis that, as the fourth task, there should be an expansion of the mass movement to study the works of certain Communist theoreticians, Hua announced that volume 5 of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works* would come off the press in the first six months of 1977, and that the party's Central Committee had also decided to undertake the publication of Mao's collected works. Holding that the domestic situation was "excellent," Chairman Hua again quoted Chairman Mao Tse-tung: "Great disorder across the land leads to great order." Having toppled the Gang of Four,

we will certainly be able . . . to achieve stability and unity in our country, consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and bring about great order across the land.

Soon afterward, in the first 1977 issue of the party journal *Red Flag*, the theoretical group of the General Office of the State Council issued something in the nature of a supporting statement, designated as being "In Commemoration of the First Anniversary of the Passing of Our Esteemed and Beloved Premier Chou En-lai."¹¹

In that long statement, it was charged that, to usurp supreme party and state leadership, the Four had acted in opposition to Chairman Mao and had tried to overthrow Premier Chou "and a large number of leading party, government and army comrades at the central and local levels." Chou was depicted as the model bureaucrat (as indeed he was), loyally serving the nation's cause under the direction of the leadership, i.e., Chairman Mao. It was in accordance with Mao's instruction, according to this report, that Chou had proposed, in his report to the Fourth National People's Congress of January, 1975, that the nation should achieve the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology ("the four modernizations") before the end of the century. The study ended by saying that:

Under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the movement to expose and criticize the "gang of four" is a spur to the rapid growth of modern socialist production. The goal of building our country into a powerful modern socialist state before the end of the century will certainly be achieved!

"TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS"

The ultimate sanction for the new pragmatic course in domestic affairs would come from the deceased Chairman Mao himself. Premier Hua, in his December 25 speech, had referred to a literary production which, he said, the conference had conscientiously studied, namely Chairman Mao's "brilliant" work, "On the Ten Major Relationships." This speech was delivered by Mao at a meeting of the Politburo in April, 1956, two years before the Great Leap Forward and with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) a full decade in the future. On December 26

¹⁰For the text, see *Peking Review*, January 1, 1977, pp. 31-44.

¹¹*Peking Review*, January 14, 1977, pp. 8-21.

(Mao's birthday), the *People's Daily* published the text of that speech.¹²

The speech comprised the very essence of pragmatic Maoism. Mao treated economics, domestic politics and foreign affairs under ten individual headings. In the economic sphere, Mao put the prime emphasis on the development of heavy industry, with discussion of the relationship of heavy industry to light industry and agriculture. He linked progress in defense construction to the growth of economic construction—which could be furthered by the reduction of military and administrative expenditures. In the relationship between the central and local authorities, the overcentralization of authority was to be avoided, in favor of a judicious granting of local autonomy.

Mao was somewhat ambiguous:

We want both unity and particularity. To build a powerful socialist country it is imperative to have a strong and unified central leadership and unified planning and discipline throughout the country; disruption of this indispensable unit is impermissible. At the same time, it is essential to bring the initiative of the local authorities into full play and let each locality enjoy the particularity suited to its local conditions. . . .

It was nevertheless evident that, to Mao's way of thinking in the 1950's, "unified central leadership" was of prime importance, and the "initiative of local authorities" was subordinated to the will of the center. What was "the relationship between China and other countries"? Mao asserted that it was Chinese policy to learn from foreign countries "all that is genuinely good in the political, economic, scientific and technological fields and in literature and art." This was a far remove from the chauvinist doctrine of "self-reliance" which, applied with special vigor in the "radical" post-GPCR period, had inhibited the People's Republic from obtaining the greatest possible benefits by borrowing foreign technology and skills. It can easily be surmised that, for China's profit, Peking proposes to emphasize appreciably freer international exchanges than it has allowed in recent years, especially in the technological realm.

And then, in April, 1977, volume 5 of Mao's *Selected Works* was published as promised. Since the work covers the period of Maoist pragmatism from 1949 to 1957 (the eve of the Great Leap Forward) and has been

edited under the direction of Premier Hua Kuo-feng, it almost certainly eschews the radical, voluntarist approach and falls in line with the moderate trend that has dominated the Chinese domestic scene since the death of Mao and the purge of the Gang of Four.¹³

Premier Hua will profess to be a faithful disciple of the patriarchal ideologue, Mao Tse-tung, and he will be able to quote authoritative excerpts from the Chairman's *Works*. But Hua's Maoism will be distinctly selective, and it is probable that in practice he will be found more closely associated with the thought habits of that cardinal organization man, Chou En-lai. In the new regime, there will be a reduced role for ideologues and an enhanced role for efficient bureaucrats and for experts in all fields.

The future naturally is attended by uncertainties: at this writing (July, 1977), Hua is still in the process of consolidating his power and defining his policies in the domestic arena. But Hua Kuo-feng enjoys the support of powerful elements in the party, the army and the government; and since the death of Mao the radicals' strength has been drastically reduced. They will probably not be able to stage a comeback in the visible future.

Some programmed events will constitute reliable guideposts to the road ahead. In his talk of December 25, 1976, Premier Hua stated that "The Central Committee is going to launch a movement of party consolidation and rectification throughout the party at an opportune moment next year." The opportune moment was duly contrived. In late April, "a good source" in Peking was quoted as saying that a plenary session of the CCP Central Committee was to be convened to deal with various "organizational" matters stemming from the October crisis, including the case of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and that then, probably late in 1977, the CCP would hold its Eleventh Congress.¹⁴

The CCP Central Committee actually convened in midyear, and ended its meeting with a communiqué of July 22 announcing its confirmation of the Politburo's appointment of Premier Hua to the chairmanships of the party and of the CCP Military Commission; and the restoration of Teng Hsiao-p'ing to his posts of Deputy Premier, Chief of the PLA General Staff, Vice Chairman of the CCP Military Commission, member

(Continued on page 86)

¹²English-language version, "On the Ten Major Relationships," *Peking Review*, January 1, 1977. Of interest and significance in this general connection is a version derived from a 1967 text contained in the book by Stuart R. Schram (ed.), *Chairman Mao Talks to the People. Talks and Letters: 1956-1971* (New York: Pantheon, 1976). The 1976 text incorporates certain changes, analyzed and weighed by Professor Schram in "Chairman Hua Edits Mao's Literary Heritage: 'On the 10 Great Relationships,'" *China Quarterly*, March, 1977, pp. 126-35.

¹³For a brief preliminary survey of the work, see Fox Butterfield, *The New York Times*, April 16, 1977.

¹⁴Alain Jacob, *Le Monde*, April 22, 1977.

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"Whatever the elements of power and however adroitly they may be maneuvered, there is no reason to assume that China's present policies will follow any straight-line projection into the future. On the contrary, change—perhaps very crucial change—should be expected."

The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic

BY DONALD W. KLEIN

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CHINA'S relations with the two superpowers are twin themes that run like a scarlet thread through her foreign policy. Be it love or hate, China's fixation on the Soviet Union and the United States was paramount in 1950, in 1960, and in 1970, and it will assuredly be so into the 1980's. And why not? Only the superpowers can jeopardize China's national security; indeed, only they can destroy the People's Republic.

The superpowers are even enshrined in the Chinese Communist party (CCP) constitution. Pejoratively enshrined, one should add, and they are the only foreign countries mentioned by name in this fundamental document. The CCP is united with "oppressed people and nations" and "fights together with them to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—to overthrow imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction. . . ."

Intermeshed with her view of Moscow and Washington are China's policies toward Japan and the third world. Neither is perceived as a threat. In a sense, the contrary is true; both can help fend off the superpowers, especially the currently designated "more dangerous" power, the Soviet Union.

China's military power is an important factor in her foreign policy.* Her military power is largely defensive, characterized by a large army, but with much smaller air and naval components. A ground attack on China

would be a "Vietnam" to the nth power. This, of course, is understood in both Moscow and Washington.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is also a nuclear power, but with sharply constrained delivery systems. China is a regional nuclear power (e.g., against the Soviet Union), but not a global one (e.g., not against the United States). There is debate concerning future capabilities, but it appears that China will not be able to use nuclear weapons against the United States until well into the 1980's.

A decade ago a Peking-published map depicted the United States encirclement of China with military bases, demonstrating China's understandable concern over superpower military strength.¹ Intervening events sharply altered this map, especially severely deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, punctuated by the Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) and the 1969 Sino-Soviet war along the Manchurian border. China responded by a rapid military buildup in Manchuria, paralleled by diplomatic moves that led to the famous 1972 visit to China of United States President Richard Nixon. Thus, by the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Soviet Union became the new "encircler" or "principal enemy."²

Is Soviet "encirclement" real? It is indeed real when one notes the Soviet Union's naval entry into the Indian Ocean in the 1970's, the stepped up Soviet diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia, the growth by one-third (with firepower tripled) of the Soviet Pacific Fleet between 1965 and 1975,³ not to mention the more familiar massive buildup of Soviet forces along the Manchurian border. This Soviet encirclement complicates China's Taiwan policy and illustrates a prime restraint on Chinese power, military or otherwise.

The "liberation" of Taiwan was for many years seen as a bilateral affair between China and the United States. Taiwan is linked to the United States by the 1954 defense treaty and by United States diplomatic recognition. In the 1972 "Shanghai Communiqué" the United States declared "that Taiwan is part of China." Yet Peking knows that a military assault on

*See the article on military affairs by Harvey Nelsen in this issue, pp. 59 ff.

¹Arthur Huck, *The Security of China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 12, citing *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking) [People's Daily], January 29, 1966.

²Linda D. Dillon et al., "Who was the Principal Enemy? Shifts in Official Chinese Perceptions of the Superpowers, 1968-1969," *Asian Survey*, vol. 17, no. 5 (May, 1977), pp. 456-73.

³Sheldon W. Simon, "Peking, Moscow, and Japan: The Quest for Influence," *Issues and Studies*, August, 1976, pp. 1-14.

Taiwan would destroy the Sino-American rapprochement and thus jeopardize the opportunity to balance Soviet power in East Asia with United States power.

Thus it is no surprise that Peking has been "patient" regarding Taiwan's "liberation." It is a matter of priorities. China is attempting to use the United States as a surrogate power to compensate for her own military weaknesses—as demonstrated by her encouragement to Japan and the Philippines to allow United States bases in these countries.

POST-MAO ACCOMMODATION WITH MOSCOW?

One solution to this apparent dilemma would be an accommodation with the Soviet Union—the perhaps dubious theory being that nothing would more quickly force Washington to abandon Taiwan than close Sino-Soviet ties. There is some logic to this. But Mao's heirs have apparently accepted his view that a compromise with Moscow is the ultimate betrayal. Through mid-1977, denunciations of Moscow remain as savage as they were before Mao's death. A late 1976 resumption of the oft-interrupted Sino-Soviet negotiations on border problems hinted at improved ties, but the Soviet negotiator was sent packing early in 1977 with an empty suitcase. Soon afterward the Soviets moved to the verbal attack, attempting to portray the new Chinese leaders as wild-eyed militarists and warning against the sale of Western arms to China.⁴

China's military power, in brief, is sharply limited—limited in part by her own policies and more so by outside factors.⁵ Even as a regional and conventional military power China suffers clear constraints. Witness Peking's strong support for Tokyo's attempts to persuade Moscow to return four small islands off Japan's northern coast. Verbal support is plentiful; military support is unthinkable. Global military power is far more limited. To cite one case, Peking grandly denounced Soviet-Cuban military actions in southern Africa (particularly Angola). Yet she was obviously in no position to counter in military terms. China, in sum, is clearly not a military superpower, although she possesses sufficient nuclear strength to restrain her powerful northern neighbor. This returns us to our original point: China's military power is mainly defensive in nature.

In aggregate terms, China is today the seventh or eighth largest industrial power, but measured in per

capita terms her enormous population diminishes this power greatly. By either measurement, Peking is a marginal actor in world trade.

Nonetheless, although dwarfed by neighboring Japan and the Soviet Union, China is capable of exerting regional economic power, if only because of the small economies of nearby nations. Thus, China can exert influence on Ceylon by buying up large portions of Ceylon's rubber crop or by buying (or not buying) heavily in the Australian wheat market.

In fact, however, China has seldom exerted her economic power in nearby countries. But she has used trade to facilitate her policies toward Japan, her largest trading partner. Past difficulties have given way to fairly smooth Sino-Japanese trade in recent years, as evidenced by China's recent (April, 1977) five-year trade pact with Japan, which provides for increased exports of oil and coal to Japan.⁶

Trade with Japan is now mainly complementary—China has plentiful natural resources and resource-shy Japan sorely needs them. Beyond this, China has good reason to make Japan a crucial pillar of her policy in northeast Asia: she is fully aware that the Soviet Union persistently (if clumsily) dangles resource-rich Siberia before Japanese eyes. If China refused to sell her resources to Japan, or closed her market to Japanese machinery and fertilizers, Japan might well turn to the Soviet Union. Any further Soviet buildup in eastern Siberia, which partially surrounds Manchuria, is viewed with the gravest concern in Peking. It is thus not surprising that in recent years trade with Japan has constituted about one-fourth of all Chinese trade. China is obviously using her limited but not trifling economic power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Moreover, Chinese prospects for the future are good; the Japanese would rather deal with the Chinese (whom they admire in many ways) than with the Russians (whom they dislike in even more ways).⁷

The United States is also involved. Current United States encouragement of Sino-Japanese trade could quickly change to discouragement if Peking took some action to alienate the United States. A military "liberation" of Taiwan springs to mind, or direct Chinese involvement in a renewed Korean War. Thus, Sino-Japanese economic ties are circumscribed by "conditions" tacitly understood by all concerned.

INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN AID

Two other forms of economic power—investments and aid—deserve mention. Peking does not invest money abroad, neighboring Hong Kong and Macao being minor but lucrative exceptions.⁸ Nor is foreign investment allowed in China. This "no-investment" policy has the dual effect of precluding the manipulation of China and denying China the ability to manipulate others. But demonstrating the transformation of weakness in economic policy into strength in foreign policy,

⁴*The New York Times*, April 23, May 15, 1977.

⁵See, in particular, Dwight H. Perkins, "The Constraints on Chinese Foreign Policy," in Donald C. Hellmann, ed., *China and Japan: A New Balance of Power* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), pp. 159-95.

⁶*Christian Science Monitor*, April 6, 1977.

⁷Chae-Jin Lee, *Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), especially chapter 4.

⁸In any event, the People's Republic regards both as Chinese territory, and thus not "abroad."

China constantly reminds others (especially nations of the third world) that she does not "meddle" in other nations' affairs. This claim is made all the more attractive given the great prominence of multinational corporations.

Aid is another matter. Peking committed \$2.4 billion in long-term "soft" loans or direct grants to the developing nations between 1970 and 1974.⁹ The sum of \$2.4 billion is not large if it is stretched over several score developing nations, but it can have a substantial impact in selected areas. Thus, Peking has poured great sums into Tanzania and Zambia, mainly to build the famous Tan-Zam Railway. Similarly, on the theory that an enemy of India is a friend of China, Peking has made substantial contributions (including military aid) to Pakistan. But regardless of amounts or selectivity, it is clear that the superpowers can easily outmatch China in the aid arena.

Parenthetically, while Peking scornfully rejects such notions as "the north-south" problem, its economic aid, seen as a form of power, runs parallel—and not in opposition—to superpower aid programs.

China's much-touted self-reliance doctrine also applies to the receipt of foreign economic aid. This proud (and conservative) "cash-on-the-barrelhead" concept derives from Mao. But even before his death, and continuing today, there were increasing signs that various euphemisms (e.g., "extended credit") were somewhat eroding this once rigid doctrine. The point should not be overdrawn. By and large, Peking is not dependent on aid, and in Chinese eyes this is a form of economic strength if only because it provides an independence that might otherwise be compromised.

VIETNAM AND KOREA

Special mention should be made of two regional focuses of Peking's economic power: Vietnam and Korea. Concrete figures are lacking, but China is clearly a major donor to both nations. Yet in both countries, China competes directly with the economically more powerful Soviet Union. Moreover, Vietnam and North Korea have skillfully utilized this competition to their own advantage. There is another complicating factor in Vietnam: Vietnam is interested in high-level economic ties with several economic powers—most notably the United States, Japan, and possibly France. If we further note that Vietnam may aspire to a larger regional role, the economic power of the People's Republic of China may diminish, not grow, in and around Vietnam during the next few years.

Korea neatly illustrates the meshing of China's military and economic power considerations. The Chinese have the deepest interest in Korea, if only because Korea borders on Manchuria, China's industrial heartland.

⁹Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 732.

As already noted, China has made it very evident, especially to Japan and the Philippines, that she does not want to see a total United States military withdrawal from the western Pacific because she fears that the Soviet Union would fill a real or imagined vacuum. Does this strategy apply to South Korea and, more particularly, to the pending United States withdrawal of its ground forces? Outsiders cannot be certain. Yet many observers point to a "hostile Korea" as perhaps the most likely catalyst leading to a rearmed Japan, a prospect loathsome to Chinese foreign policy planners. Seen from this perspective, the "Korean problem" is as vexing for Peking as it is for the United States.

It should also be noted that if in the global power game China has only two military competitors, in the economic sphere she has a host of them. Aside from the superpowers, these competitors include Japan, the Common Market, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and even relatively small Asian nation neighbors, like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, with their booming economies.

Knowing their own economic shortcomings, the Chinese have tried in recent years to convert weakness into strength. China now strongly supports the Common Market, especially because it stands as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. It was no accident, for example, that British opposition leader and staunch Conservative Margaret Thatcher was accorded red carpet treatment in Peking in April, 1977, and that her concern about the "massive buildup of Soviet military strength" was prominently recorded by the Chinese media. China even extends limited verbal support to Common Market agreements to aid the third world (for example, agreements that open markets for third world goods in West Europe).

THE OPENING TO THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS

Another crucial point involves China's military and economic strength. China must keep doors open to high-level technology and large-scale grain imports. The third world can furnish neither; only the United States, Canada, and Australia can supply massive grain shipments. And although by the mid-1970's it appeared that China was nearing "food autonomy," less favorable 1976 harvests sent her back into the only available markets and illustrated that the food problem in China lingers on.

With regard to technology, the Soviet door is closed, but China can, and does, deal with Japan, West Europe and the United States. Most technological imports are needed for general economic development, but the stakes escalate dramatically when military technology is concerned. China has approached this gingerly to avoid alarming the Soviets, but limited military technology and goods have in fact been imported, and the whole issue is now being debated in the

United States.¹⁰ This is not a one-way street—the United States and Japan have powerful interests connected with the East Asian quadrilateral relationship that must take Soviet attitudes into serious account.

THE AMERICAN CONNECTION

Many observers, noting the fundamental political differences between the United States and China and the improbability of intimate Sino-American military links, have stressed economic prospects. There is some pessimism because, after trade between China and the United States rose to well over \$900 million in 1974, it fell to about \$330 million in 1976. The reasons for this decline, so runs the argument, are several, including the failure to settle mutual financial claims and the denial to China of both American Export-Import Bank credits and “most-favored-nation” treatment. Yet these arguments fail to note that Chinese exports to the United States have steadily risen, reaching \$203 million in 1976.¹¹ Moreover, China resumed her talks with the United States on the financial claims issue in the spring of 1977.

Still others dismiss economic matters as eyewash. They believe that the crux of the issue is political-military, by which they mean that genuine links can be forged only after the Shanghai Communiqué is fulfilled, that is, after the United States removes all its forces (now a mere 1,200) from Taiwan and formally recognizes the People's Republic. This may be so, but at least in the short run China appears to be willing to “sacrifice” Taiwan for higher priorities. Or, as *The New York Times* put it editorially, Peking “does not appear to be intensifying pressure on the United States to abandon Taiwan.”¹²

Summarizing thus far, this analysis places heavy emphasis on the rather impressive array of constraints on Chinese military and economic power. Although a nation may “develop” in many ways in domestic affairs (as China has so clearly developed), this does not necessarily strengthen it relative to other powers in foreign affairs. The operative word is “relative,” which among the developing nations often is transformed into “closing the gap.”

For example, China may have “closed the gap” vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear capacities. Yet the gap may be widening if one compares Chinese and Soviet armored forces. In the economic realm, inso-

far as foreign trade is linked to economic power, Peking may be losing ground in a global sense. For example, from the late 1950's to the late 1960's, China's total trade fell from 1.7 percent to 0.7 percent of total world trade.¹³ The point, of course, is not that China is limping into some bypath of history. Rather, the People's Republic operates in a world in which other key nations are also developing, even if they are not described as “developing” nations.

IDEOLOGICAL POWER

In addition to China's military and economic power, there is a closely interrelated third form of power: ideological (or normative) power. This presents analytical problems because of the amorphousness of ideology, the difficulty in measuring its impact abroad, and the rapid changes in focus of Chinese ideology in the 28-year history of the People's Republic.

During her first decade, the ideological “power” of the People's Republic was for the most part the tail wagged by the Russian hound. Such as it was, Chinese influence was largely confined to the Communist bloc, though in the latter part of the decade China probably had some intra-bloc power as an advocate of “separate roads to socialism.”

To be sure, Chinese leaders made some effort to extend ideological power beyond the Communist world through the “spirit of Bandung” and the “five principles of people's coexistence.” Recall, however, that this attempt paralleled roughly similar Soviet policies that fell under Moscow's rubric of the “spirit of Geneva.” There is little doubt that China did have some impact in both Asia and Africa; witness the sprouting of various transregional governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, many of which contained the words “Afro-Asian solidarity” or some such variant.

From the late 1950's through the late 1960's, China's international ideological postures changed with great speed. For portions of this period, the Chinese leadership “turned in,” deeply troubled by severe internal crises—most notably the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). Especially during these crises, there was little appeal for what has come to be called the “Chinese model.”

For a time in the early 1960's Peking contested Moscow for the title of the new Rome of the world Communist movement, but this attempt was soon abandoned and relegated, presumably, to some later stage of history. Shifting from a structured international Communist arena to a looser third world framework, China then attempted to express herself through what might be called international “revolutionary aid.” This coincided with the massive United States involvement in Vietnam. The classic statement was Defense Minister Lin Biao's 1965 call-to-arms of guerrilla forces against colonial and, oftentimes, established governments.

Notwithstanding Secretary of State Dean Rusk's

¹⁰See the articles by military correspondent Drew Middleton, *The New York Times*, February 28, 1977, June 24, 1977; A. Doak Barnett, *China Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 51-63; Michel Oksenberg, “The United States and China,” in Hellmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-92.

¹¹*The New York Times* editorial, May 9, 1977. The earlier peak in trade resulted mainly from huge American agricultural exports to China, which caused an enormous imbalance in trade against China.

¹²*The New York Times*, May 5, 1977.

¹³Perkins, in Hellmann, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

interpretation of Lin's article as China's *Mein Kampf*, central to Lin's thesis was an application of the Maoist self-reliance doctrine to foreign affairs: guerrilla forces must rely essentially on their own resources.

Peking's appeal abroad was perhaps marginally assisted by what many felt was the extraordinary American overreaction in Vietnam, but if there was widespread sympathy for Vietnam, this did not necessarily rub off on China. It should be remembered that when Lin wrote his famous piece China was still a pariah nation in many eyes. China had only recently recovered from the disastrous Great Leap Forward; she had diplomatic relations with only 50 countries; and she was not then a member of the United Nations. In fact, Peking was actively encouraging Indonesia's quest to establish an alternative "Revolutionary United Nations," at a time when many third world nations measured their international respectability by U.N. membership.

China's ideological power sank to an all-time low during the Cultural Revolution. Note the words of Premier Chou En-lai's eulogizers on the first anniversary of his death: During the Cultural Revolution China "made enemies everywhere"; there had been

incidents involving attacking, smashing and burning foreign missions in China, which had been unprecedented since the founding of New China. This impaired China's prestige and her normal relations with some countries.¹⁴

THE CHINESE MODEL

In brief, until the early 1970's, Peking's ideological power went through a series of ups and downs. But memories are short, and now the world's press is filled with stories that can be subsumed under the term "The Chinese Model." We read incessantly of the disciplined people untroubled by law-and-order problems, clean streets, dedicated youth, competent medical care, sufficient food, the modest personal habits of the rulers, and on and on. (The only items missing are "railroads that run on time," which no admirer of China with a sense of history would think of using.)

The "Chinese model" is of course the "self-reliant China," with all its attractions for third world and many other peoples. Never mind that many perceptions of "the" Chinese model are fuzzy, distorted or false. This fuzziness, these distortions and these falsehoods probably accrue to China's benefit—and power. Thus Peking spends great sums on its Foreign Ministry, its myriad "people's" organizations, the New China News Agency, and innumerable magazines and pamphlets that extol the "New China."

There is, then, an extraordinary attraction in the self-reliant China model, especially to third world nations which, like China, want to "stand up" and be respected. Yet the model is not without difficulties, if only because

by definition self-reliance is so strongly linked to sovereignty and nationalism. In any case, most third world countries are too small in area, population and resources to be truly self-reliant. Most must depend on some form of regional cooperation, which leads toward what can be regarded as the opposite of nationalism: interdependence. Witness the current attempts by third world nations so frequently dependent on one commodity—like bauxite—to band together to strengthen their market position. Still, the dignity that adheres to Chinese-style self-reliance perhaps offers a valuable lesson for many developing nations, a point that China seeks to emphasize.

PROBLEMS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Because her ideological power is now mainly directed toward the third world, China's problems with several third world nations should be remembered. For example, China either has no relations or weak relations with two huge and important third world countries, Indonesia and India. Only recently has Peking established formal relations with Malaysia (1974), the Philippines, Thailand, and Bangladesh (all 1975). The People's Republic is well aware that nationalism is a powerful force in all these neighboring states, and that in several of them large and often well-to-do Chinese communities are a mixed blessing.

Chinese policies in South and Southeast Asia contain contradictions between ideological and strategic interests. For example, the South Asian effort to establish an Indian Ocean non-nuclear zone raises the specter of further Soviet "encirclement" unless the United States maintains a naval presence (which is not acceptable to the South Asian governments that support the non-nuclear zone). In Southeast Asia, Peking supports the neutralist thrust of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite Chinese hostility toward Indonesia, ASEAN's largest and potentially most influential member. ASEAN strength might help fend off the Soviet Union. Yet Vietnam has shown little enthusiasm for ASEAN; thus Peking's third world connections might get snarled in its ties with Vietnam should the latter seek her own form of hegemony in Southeast Asia.

Farther afield, China avidly supports OPEC and all anti-Israeli nations; at the same time, she ignores Iranian sales of oil to Israel and Taiwan's active economic links with Saudi Arabia (the only Middle East

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¹⁴*Peking Review*, no. 5, January 28, 1977, pp. 14-15.

"... in the new leadership under Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the military has made a political comeback. ... The PLA is apparently attempting to collect its political debts by means of a more favorable allocation of resources. ... This apparent upgrading of PLA capabilities can only mean that China is preparing for a prolonged period of continued hostility with the Soviet Union."

China's Great Wall: The People's Liberation Army

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CHINA'S People's Liberation Army (PLA) includes naval, air and ground forces.* Its size is a well-kept secret, but Western estimates range around 3.6 million to 4 million men.¹ More than 3 million men are in the ground forces; naval and air forces total about 275,000 and 250,000, respectively. Although these figures sound impressive, if not ominous, the PLA may be smaller than the Soviet military.² China's ground forces are undoubtedly the world's largest, but they are large because China must compensate for poor strategic and tactical mobility and the relative weakness of her air and naval forces. Maintaining such a large standing army is costly. China's defense budget is estimated at \$17 billion, i.e., one-sixth of the United States defense budget. However, the figure represents about 10 percent of China's gross national product as opposed to 6 percent for the United States.

AIR FORCE

For many years, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has been the world's third largest—after the United States and the Soviet air forces. The PLAAF has about 4,300 combat aircraft, including 3,500 jet fighters, about 300 fighter-bombers, and 400 medium and light bombers. Non-combat aircraft con-

sist of 400 transport planes and about 300 helicopters. In case of mobilization, a few hundred transports now under civilian control could be added to the PLAAF. In addition to the flying units, there are ground-based air defense and early warning systems, and four divisions of airborne forces (although the transports can only airlift a few regiments at a time).

The PLAAF is not nearly so strong now as its size would indicate. In the mid-1950's, it was a formidable air defense system equipped with the latest Soviet-supplied fighters. Since the Sino-Soviet rift, most of the inventory has become increasingly obsolescent. The fighter-interceptor force is composed almost entirely of 1,500 MiG-17's and 2,000 MiG-19's, both of which were designed in the 1950's. Only a very small percentage of the planes are equipped as all-weather fighters. The most modern interceptor currently operational is the MiG-21, and the PLAAF has only about 75 of these. In the bomber fleet, the story is similar. The most numerous is the Il-28, a jet light-bomber designed in 1947. The indigenously produced Tu-16 medium bomber has a much greater range and load capacity, but it, too, is more than 20 years old.

During the past decade, China has been producing a large number of combat aircraft. A significant portion of the military budget during the 1960's went into developing serial production of the MiG-19 and MiG-21 jet fighters and the Tu-16 jet bomber. China established production lines under the very adverse conditions of a worldwide embargo on strategic goods. The aircraft are close copies of the Soviet models, but they are truly "made in China" and do not rely on foreign components. However, there has been a major setback in the program to modernize the interceptor force. The Chinese-produced MiG-21 was a failure. About eight years were required to establish serial production. Despite the expense and effort, only about 50 MiG-21's were added to the PLAAF inventory; and the production stopped suddenly after only two years of sporadic operation (1971-1972). The indigenously produced

*Some of the information in this article is derived from the author's study, *The Chinese Military System: An Organizational History of the People's Liberation Army* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

¹Strength figures used here are based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1976-77*. However, the most recent United States Department of Defense figures have estimated China's armed forces total at 4.3 million. See General George S. Brown, *U.S. Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1978*, U.S. Congress, January 20, 1977.

²Estimates place Soviet forces at about 4.4 million men. However, many of those men are doing capital construction, land reclamation and other work similar to China's "production/construction corps," which are not an integral part of the PLA. A comparison of the two nations' combat and combat support units would reveal that they are about equal in total personnel.

MiG-21's have nearly all been out of operation since 1974.

It is not certain what the problem was, but the MiG-21 uses a high-output single engine that demands very sophisticated metallurgy. This might have been beyond China's capabilities. The production failure was probably the major reason why China contracted with Rolls Royce for the purchase of, and licensing rights to, the Spey jet engine. In a few years, the assembly line should be moving again, with a radically modified aircraft.

Production of the Tu-16 bomber also was drastically reduced about 1972, after fewer than 100 planes had been produced. However, the reason for slowing production of the Tu-16 bomber was strategic rather than technical. With about 100 Tu-16's in the inventory, the PLAAF had little use for additional obsolescent medium bombers. All China's available resources were consequently shifted to missile production and development.

The most spectacular advance thus far is the F-9. Resembling an enlarged MiG-19, this aircraft is intended to serve primarily as a fighter-bomber. Evaluations of the performance and range of the plane vary markedly, but all observers agree that it outperforms the MiG-19 and is probably capable of supersonic speeds in level flight.³ The F-9 has been in production since 1969, but United States intelligence analysts believe that output has been hampered by technical difficulties; thus there are now only about 300 in the inventory.⁴ Another new aircraft of Chinese design has been dubbed the Sian-A by Western intelligence agencies. It is a delta-wing interceptor that may be capable of Mach 2 speeds. However, the Sian-A has had its share of problems—it was in prototype testing for eight years.

The ground-based air defenses also have serious weaknesses. The core of the system is the radar-guided, surface-to-air missile (SAM). China's SAM dates from the 1950's (SAM-2), and American pilots flying against similar missiles in North Vietnam found that they could outmaneuver or neutralize the missiles by electronic countermeasures. Should China find herself at war with

the U.S.S.R. or the United States, air superiority would quickly be lost to the enemy.

NAVY

Even more than the Air Force, the People's Liberation Army Naval Forces (PLAN) are defensive in nature. Although naval craft total about 1,500, there are only about 100 fighting ships, including submarines. Most of the rest fall into the "fast attack craft" category. The warships of the PLAN do not range far outside Chinese territorial waters. China's submarines have never been known to take extended voyages. The largest ships in the inventory are seven new missile-firing destroyers and a half-dozen frigates. The last keel for the destroyers was laid in 1971, but another new class of guided missile frigates is expected to appear in a year or so.⁵ Several older vessels have been refitted with the Styx guided missile system.

Submarine construction has been active and the underwater fleet now numbers 67—the world's third largest force.⁶ Most of these submarines are Soviet designed, dating from the 1940's, but over one-third have been built in Chinese shipyards over the past decade. Two of the submarines are more modern—one Soviet "G" class ballistic missile-firing submarine (for which the Chinese do not yet have a missile), and a nuclear-powered vessel designed and built in China. The latter is a "hunter-killer" submarine equipped with conventional torpedoes. However, it was launched five years ago and has yet to become operational—perhaps because of propulsion problems.⁷

The strength of the PLA lies in its large fleet of fast attack craft. Among those are about 140 Soviet-designed "Osa" and "Komar" guided missile patrol boats, many of which have been constructed in China. These are small, fast boats which carry respectively four and two radar-guided missiles. China has recently designed and produced her own twin guided missile craft that is reportedly superior to the Russian designs in rough seas. These patrol boats are intended to offer a dangerous obstacle to any enemy attempting to penetrate Chinese coastal waters. The Styx cruise missile is identical to the missile used in coastal defense installations and on the new Luta class destroyers. The missiles carry a high explosive warhead with enough power to cripple large fighting ships and aircraft carriers. Their maximum range is 23 miles. Guided missile patrol boats are relatively inexpensive and easy to build, and they provide a coastal defense system that theoretically could hold its own against a much more powerful naval force.

Against advanced navies, China's guided missile patrol boats have one serious weakness. The Styx missile is vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, as was proved in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Egyptian navy was equipped with Styx missiles supplied by the Soviet Union. They scored a very low percentage of hits against the Israeli navy, which jammed the homing

³Angus Fraser, *The People's Liberation Army: Communist China's Armed Forces* (New York: Crane and Russack, 1973), p. 11.

⁴Sydney J. James, "The Chinese Defense Burden," *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, July, 1975).

⁵Defense Intelligence Agency statement in *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1975* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, July, 1975), p. 117.

⁶Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁷*Jane's Fighting Ships, 1975-76* (Bridgeport, Conn.: Key Book Service, 1976), p. 81. See also Thomas H. Moorer, "General Purpose Forces Compared—U.S., Russia and China," *Commander's Digest*, vol. 15, no. 16 (April 18, 1974), pp. 13-14.

radars carried by the missiles.⁸ China is not in a position to compete effectively in the electronic arms race, so presumably her missiles will remain vulnerable to enemy jamming. Partially offsetting this weakness are the large number of boats and missiles available. Even if many fcings were thrown off course by electronic countermeasures, a few might still reach their targets.

Other weaknesses of the missile patrol boats include a short operating range and the possibility that they cannot be used effectively in very rough seas. In addition, although the boats have low profiles that would make their detection difficult before they came into firing range, the missile craft are almost defenseless against air attack. That is one reason why all the attack craft train in high-speed, mass formations, often at night and in foul weather. The tactical concept is to combine surprise with the sheer weight of numbers, to overwhelm the defenses of an enemy fleet.

The PLAN is virtually useless in terms of extending China's power abroad. Thus, after the abortive Indonesian Communist coup d'état in 1965, when the large overseas Chinese population there was indiscriminately persecuted and tens of thousands were killed, China could only protest. Her navy was not strong enough to pressure the Indonesian government, nor could China demand and carry out an evacuation by sea. The PLAN has a very weak troop-lift capability. The landing craft are few and old; troop transports are practically nonexistent; and the merchant marine is still small, although expanding rapidly. Should it be necessary eventually to invade Taiwan, China will have to gain undisputed control of the air so that her vast junk fleet can carry and supply the invasion force.

The PLAN has traditionally engaged in very little combined arms training, although there has been some step-up in this activity during 1976. In the summer of 1976, a large-scale amphibious exercise was conducted on the coast of Fukien Province opposite Taiwan. Paratroops as well as an amphibious landing force were involved. The PLA may be attempting to improve its combined arms capabilities; it was also certainly trying to give Taiwan a message.

Over the past decade, China's naval building program has focused on submarine construction, guided missile patrol boats and other fast attack craft; only about a dozen fighting ships have been produced. Given the weaknesses of the Styx missile and the vulnerability of diesel submarines to modern anti-submarine detection and attack systems, the force-building mix seems puzzling. It is possible that the People's Republic is trying to develop a contingency capability for the Taiwan problem. The submarine force is now large enough to blockade Taiwan, and the Nationalist Chinese military has little anti-submarine warfare capability. The new guided-missile destroyers and destroyer-escorts are

superior in quality to the more numerous destroyers of the Nationalists, and the fast attack craft could sweep the Taiwanese fishing fleet and merchant shipping from the seas. By physically isolating Taiwan, Peking might force a political settlement without a risky full-scale invasion. Of course, this possibility presumes the abrogation of the United States-Nationalist Chinese defense treaty and Taipei's rejection of peaceful unification offers. Before such strategy could be tested, China would probably have to reach an understanding with Japan and some limited détente with the U.S.S.R.

GROUND FORCES

Although the PLA lags behind other major armies in technical sophistication, mobility and heavy equipment, the Chinese military is clearly capable of defending its homeland against invasion by conventional forces. This defense credibility is due partly to sheer size, but more credit belongs to the high morale of the troops and the way in which the ground forces are structured.

Two major components make up the infantry. The first of these are the 37 "main force" corps (often referred to as "armies"). Each army is normally composed of three divisions and smaller support units totaling almost 50,000 men at full strength. These units have most of the available mechanization and heavy equipment. (The rest of the army's main forces are 10 armored, 20 artillery, 4 airborne and 23 engineering divisions.) The "regional forces" are the second major component of the infantry. These units are equipped with lighter weapons and have fewer troops than the equivalent echelons of the corps. Most regional forces are independent regiments and battalions, although there are about 65 divisions.

Were China to be invaded, the main forces would carry the battle to the enemy, while regional forces would defend their own localities and mobilize the militia and production/construction corps into reserves for the main forces. If the enemy penetrated very far, some regional forces and militia would act as guerrilla units behind their lines, while other militia and regional units would keep the main forces supplied and provide personnel replacements and intelligence on enemy movements.

For years, the obvious weaknesses of the ground forces have been reiterated, i.e., lack of firepower and mobility. Specifically, the PLA has been described as short of artillery, armor, trucks and personnel carriers. Much of the equipment is considered obsolescent. Critics point out that Chinese firepower does not begin to equal that of United States or Soviet forces until the opposing troops are within a few hundred meters of each other. (Once the fighting has become close-in, the PLA is at no disadvantage; its small arms rank among the world's best.) Furthermore, the capabilities of the ground forces actually deteriorated during most of the

⁸The Christian Science Monitor, January 21, 1974, p. 2.

1960's because of the economic aftereffects of the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Soviet rift and, later, the immersion of the PLA in administrating the country during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

By the mid-1970's, many weaknesses had been ameliorated. China now produces all types of conventional ground force weapons. Artillery production has risen markedly; China now has as many guns as the U.S.S.R. and three times as many as the United States.⁹ However, the ground forces are so large that there is still less artillery per unit than there is in the Soviet or American armies. One continuing weakness is anti-tank weaponry. Foot soldiers still rely on the conventionally styled RPG-7 rocket launcher, although most modern armies have portable anti-tank guided missiles that have greater range, accuracy and striking power than the old "bazooka"-type weapons. However, the RPG-7 is still able to knock out a modern tank.

As for armor, China is producing three types of tanks and an armored personnel carrier. The main battle tank is the T-59 medium—a copy of a Soviet design. China has created her own light tank, the T-62, and produces an improved version of a Soviet amphibious tank. All three types are now one-generation out of date, but they are by no means obsolete. All told, China has about 9,000 tanks, almost as many as the United States, but less than one-fourth the Soviet total.¹⁰ Over the past several years, China has proved able to produce almost 1,000 tanks annually, although the average is probably closer to between 600 and 800.

Thus many of the long-standing weaknesses of the ground forces have been at least partially overcome. Firepower has improved greatly over the past decade. Mobility is still lagging; the immense size of the ground forces partially makes up for the lack of strategic mobility, but the units are still at a tactical disadvantage. This could be overcome if helicopter production were greatly expanded. The infantry is well trained in every aspect except combined arms exercises. Morale is extremely high, and millions of youth are eager to serve in the military. On balance, the strengths of the ground forces far outweigh their weaknesses.

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

China's first atomic test came in 1964; her first hydrogen bomb was detonated in 1967. Now, ten years later, China has carried out almost a score of tests, ranging from ten kilotons to four megatons. The PLA's

main delivery systems are rockets. Its first medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), was a copy of a Soviet demonstration model given to China just before the Sino-Soviet split. The 7th Machine Building Ministry produced this weapon from 1964 to 1972. Highly secretive deployment was begun about 1967. Since China had relatively few missiles, it was vital that they be concealed, lest the U.S.S.R. (or the United States) should feel impelled to destroy Peking's fledgling nuclear arsenal. The secrecy was successful—at least insofar as United States intelligence was concerned.

In the 1970's, China developed two new missiles. The first was an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with a range of about 1,500 miles. The second was a two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), with a limited range of about 3,000 miles. The PLA thus can reach targets throughout the Soviet Union and most of the Asian Pacific region. However, the limited-range ICBM was only flight tested in 1976, and relatively few have been deployed thus far.¹¹ It is believed that an 8,000-mile range ICBM booster has been tested by using it to orbit China's recent earth satellites. However, that booster may not be developed into a weapons system. Thus far, China's strategic rockets all use liquid fuels that require considerable preparation to launch and are difficult to maintain. Solid fuel propellants are still in the development phase. Recent testing patterns indicate that China now has a thermonuclear warhead small enough to be used on the MRBM/IRBM's.

Currently, China has about 300 nuclear warheads and she has deployed over 70 missiles.¹² There is evidence that at least some IRBM's can be moved cross-country.¹³ Others are presumably transported by rail. This mobility would make it difficult for an adversary to carry out an effective first strike with reasonable assurance that the attack would destroy China's ability to retaliate.

By 1980, China *could* have an operational ICBM to deter distant enemies, but this is not likely. A small ICBM force is difficult to conceal from satellite imagery, thus rendering China vulnerable to a first-strike attack from the United States or Europe. Peking is believed to be countering that possibility by emphasizing the development of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). According to United States intelligence, a Chinese SLBM is expected to be operational in the early 1980's, probably predating the deployment of the more vulnerable ICBM.¹⁴

(Continued on page 88)

⁹Moorer, *op. cit.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³United States satellite photos spotted an IRBM installation 80 miles from the nearest rail line, according to *Newsweek*, April 14, 1975, p. 15.

¹⁴Statement by former CIA Director William Colby in *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China*, p. 44.

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In China's energy program, "... the fast expansion rates of the first half of the 1970's could not be sustained. However, there were also some intervening circumstances: political unrest..., the continuing lack of clear policy in some key areas, and the damage caused by several earthquakes, most notably the Tangshan tremors."

China's Energy Performance

BY VACLAV SMIL

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JUDGED both by the absolute figures and by relative international comparisons, the achievements of China's energy industries since the establishment of the People's Republic have been substantial.¹ Production and technological advances since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 have been especially impressive; when seen against this background, the performance of China's energetics in 1976 seems unexceptional. In fact, the growth rates in all major extraction industries—coal, crude oil and natural gas—were not only lower than the increases in 1975, but they fell even below the historical growth trends.

To a large extent this decline was due to the general nature of the growth process—larger systems must exhibit a slower growth—and it was clear that the fast expansion rates of the first half of the 1970's could not be sustained. However, there were also some intervening circumstances: political unrest transformed in many places into armed factional fighting, the continuing lack of clear policy in some key areas, and the damage caused by several earthquakes, most notably the severe Tangshan tremors.

The earthquake, which struck before the dawn of July 28, 1976, hit one of the principal centers of the Chinese energetics.² The epicenter of the earthquake was near Tangshan, a city of one million people on the western edge of the 2,275-square kilometer Kailuan coalfield, the country's oldest and biggest and most

modern coal mining region. The coalfield, located close to Peking, Tientsin and the major ice-free port of Chinhaungtao, has total reserves of at least four billion tons of mostly good quality coking coal (more than 7,000 kcal/kg, up to 37 percent of volatile matter, 0.5-1.5 percent of S), and eight large, highly mechanized mines were in operation before the earthquake.

Kailuan's importance to the Chinese economy has been best reflected in the growth of its production. Between 1878 and 1949, the total output equaled 185 million metric tons (mmt) while in the first quarter century of the Communist regime (1949-1974) it topped 280 mmt.³ In 1971, a decision was made to double the coalfield's designed production capacity in five years, and technical innovations and organizational improvements were undertaken in all Kailuan mines.⁴ The region's pre-earthquake production accounted for more than eight percent of the modern mine output in China.

The quake seriously damaged all mines in the region, and it is obvious that the reconstruction was difficult and costly. Although one mine (Machiakou) resumed partial operation less than 11 days after the tremor, water pumping (3 million cubic meters from Luchiao shaft alone) and necessary repairs in other localities took months to complete. At the beginning of 1977, two mines were still out of production. Other installations damaged by the earthquake included the Tangshan power station, whose output was restored to the pre-quake level only by the end of November, the Peking-Tientsin-Tangshan high voltage grid (the principal transmission link in North China), and some refineries, railways and pipelines; however, the loss of sizable, high quality coal production had the greatest economic repercussions.

COAL INDUSTRY

One of the telling signs of a less than satisfactory performance of coal mining in 1976 was the absence of a claim that has become customary for the successful industries: the announcement of the percentage increase over the previous year. Although the New China News Agency (NCNA) stated that the 1976 plan was overfulfilled by 6.3 percent, it also announced that coal output doubled in the past 10 years, which would put the aggregate 1976 production at some 440 mmt, only a

¹For a detailed interdisciplinary look at China's energetics see Vaclav Smil, *China's Energy—Achievements, Problems and Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1976).

²Smil, "Earthquake Strikes at China's Energy Centres," *Energy International*, vol. 13, no. 12 (1976), pp. 21-22.

³Heinz Harnisch and Hans-Günther Gloria, "Eindrücke vom chinesischen Steinkohlenbergbau im Kailaner Revier," *Glückauf*, vol. 3, no. 21 (November 6, 1975), p. 1010.

⁴Unless otherwise indicated, all information on recent developments in China's energetics was obtained from New China News Agency (NCNA) releases and from the transcripts of Chinese broadcasts, both sources being too numerous to reference them individually in this paper; they are regularly published by the British Broadcasting Corporation in *Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: The Far East*, by the National Technical Information Service in *Survey of People's Republic of China Press* and by the Joint Publication Research Service in *Translations on the People's Republic of China*.

three percent increase over the 427 mmt extracted in 1975.

While certainly the most important factor, the Tangshan earthquake was not the only retarding cause. Liaoning, China's second largest coal mining province, apparently did not fulfill its annual quota either, and production in many locations across the country suffered because of labor unrest and factional fighting. There are deeper—and far more intractable—problems militating against sustained high growth rates in China's coal industry (long-term exponential growth has been 5.4 percent annually): years of inadequate investment, limited mechanization of underground operations, and a very small share of the most efficient mining method—the surface, open-cast recovery.

These problems are, undoubtedly, well recognized, and the Chinese have moved toward their amelioration by establishing a separate Ministry of Coal Industry in January, 1975, and by announcing a 10-year program of comprehensive development in October of the same year.⁵ Major coal mines are to be generally mechanized (80-85 percent of operations) before 1980, and most future development is to be concentrated in the existing large coalfields and in new large mines currently under construction.

As part of this program, more than 50 new shafts were completed in 1976, including a colliery near Shanghai (Yaochiao, part of the Tatun coal mine), with an annual capacity of 1.2 mmt, and a pair of shafts in Honan (Liangwa), with an annual capacity of 0.6 mmt. Technological innovations included China's first jet turbulent flow flotation machine for the preparation of finely pulverized coal (in the Nanshan coal dressing plant, Hokang, Heilungkiang), and the first coalfield drill capable to reach 1,500 m (produced by the Shichiachuang coal mining machinery works in Hopei). As for the performance of individual coal mining regions, for the first time in many years the Chinese have released the annual production figures for several major coalfields and for Shansi, the country's leading coal province. Kailuan produced 25.2 mmt in 1975, Tatung (Shansi) 20.24 mmt in 1976, Pingdingshan (Hopei) topped 10 mmt in 1975, and Chihsi (Heilungkiang) 11 mmt in 1976; Shansi produced 70 mmt in 1975, about one-sixth of the national total.

The 1975 National Coal Conference ordered the transformation and more systematic development of numerous small coal mines. After their massive, haphazard opening during the Great Leap Years (1958-1960) and the sharp reduction and stagnation of the 1960's, native coal pits made an impressive comeback

after 1969: nearly one-third of China's raw coal (some 130 mmt in 1976) originates in these simple surface or shallow underground mines.

However, if they are to sustain their primary role as suppliers of fuel to various local industries (above all fertilizer, cement, iron and power production)—thereby bringing modernization to rural areas without the construction of an expensive transportation infrastructure—small coal mines must be developed on a somewhat larger scale and must be at least partially modernized. This task will be most important in the eight southern provinces, where small mines have lessened the South's traditional dependence on coal imports from the North. Southern production provided more than 70 percent of the regional demand in 1976, while in 1965 it provided only one-half of local needs.

OIL AND GAS

There were some setbacks for China's hydrocarbon industries in 1976,—including a “temporary tension in domestic oil supply,” conveniently blamed on the “Gang of Four,” the strong earthquake in the Sungpan-Pingwu natural gas producing area in Szechwan on August 16, extensive damage to Hanku petrochemical works in Tangshan prefecture in the July quake, and a serious blowout of an unidentified oilfield in North China in June. Nonetheless, the year was marked by advances in all critical branches of the industries.

Crude oil production grew by 13 percent and reached 85 mmt, and natural gas output increased by 11 percent to approximately 45 billion cubic meters. A new oilfield was virtually completed in North China; the richest deposits of natural gas so far were discovered in Szechwan; new high-yield offshore wells were sunk in Pohai Gulf; and urgently needed pipeline networks were extended in the north and east and also in the Red Basin.

Among the technological firsts introduced in hydrocarbon industries in the years 1975 and 1976 were several advanced geophysical exploratory techniques; equipment for transfer line catalytic cracking and bimetallic catalytic reforming, new blow-out preventors and artificial diamond drill bits, a new type of mobile oil fracturing installation and deep-well drilling rig and a natural gas pumping station. In addition, a record depth well—6,011 m—was drilled during natural gas exploration in Szechwan.

Taching in Heilungkiang remains by far the most important hydrocarbon field (in fact, it is now a group of several oil and gas fields); its 1976 output reached 24 mmt, i.e., 28 percent of the national total.⁶ The opening of new rich production zones and the injection of water into wells right from the start of extraction cut the cost of recovery by half, in comparison with the year 1965.

Shengli, located around the Huang Ho estuary in Shantung, was officially identified as China's second

⁵Editor, “PRC Coal Industry: Performance and Prospects,” *Current Scene*, vol. 14, no. 5 (1976), pp. 12-21.

⁶Detailed production statistics for China's major oilfields can be found in Bobby A. Williams, “The Chinese Petroleum Industry: Growth and Prospects” in *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975) appendix A, pp. 250-260.

largest oilfield. Since 1965, Shengli's output has been growing at an average rate of 31 percent per year, and it reached nearly 15 mmt in 1976. The field was a scene of high activity in 1976, when intensive exploratory drilling was interrupted only by the recurring ice floes and floods that inundate the low-lying silted flatland. In 1976, a Shengli drilling team set two national records—1,374 m drilled in one shift and 1,778 m drilled in one day; and most notably, a new large petrochemical complex, including two fertilizer plants, a catalyst plant and a synthetic rubber plant, entered full operation.

Refining capacity still lags behind crude oil production, but the gap has been narrowed by the construction of Shengli petrochemical plants and the further expansion of processing capacities in Taching, Nanking and Peking. The latest addition to Peking's Tungfanghung complex—a 300,000 ton per year ethylene unit completed on October 1, 1976—was the largest petrochemical project ever built in the capital. Several large petrochemical facilities have been reported to be under construction in various parts of the country. Sixty-five thousand workers are building a multiplant petrochemical complex in Shenyang (Liaoning) to be finished in 1977; 15,000 people are engaged in the construction of the Canton petrochemical works; and work on the Shanghai General Petrochemical Works (in Chinshan county, on the northern shore of Hangchow Bay) has been under way since January, 1974. Some reports have also mentioned the establishment of small hydrocarbon processing enterprises built with locally made equipment and relying mostly on locally extracted raw materials.

Major improvements were achieved in the Chinese oil ports. Talien in Liaoning became the first installation able to accommodate 100,000-ton tankers. Nine steel bridges, each with a span of 110 meters were welded together to form the loading terminal of the Taching-Talien pipeline. Since its inauguration on April 30, 1976, the new port has handled most of the Chinese oil export traffic (another 100,000-ton berth was put into operation in the middle of July). Chingtao in Hopei, the other terminal of the Taching pipeline, was rebuilt to include two wharves for 20,000-ton ships and three for 35,000-ton vessels. Chanchiang in Kwangtung now has nine berths for 10,000-ton tankers and, at high tide, can handle fully loaded 50,000-ton ships.

⁷Smil, "Communist China's Oil Exports: A Critical Evaluation," *Issues & Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3 (March, 1975), pp. 71-78; Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Energy Balance Projections* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1975); Smil, "Communist China's Oil Exports Revisited," *Issues & Studies*, vol. 12, no. 9 (September, 1976), pp. 68-73; Randall W. Hardy, *Chinese Oil* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976).

⁸"Another Victory for the Principle of Self-Reliance," *Peking Review*, vol. 19, nos. 32-33 (August 9, 1976), pp. 22-23.

A new modern oil terminal was opened after less than three years of construction in September, 1976, on Huang Island near Chingtao (Shantung). Located in the western part of Chiaocho Bay, this entirely Chinese-built port has a 1,260-meter high-rise pier with berths for 20,000- and 50,000-ton tankers. The launching of the Chinese standard 24,000-ton tankers has continued in Talien's Hungchi shipyard, and the construction of a 40,000-50,000-ton ship is apparently imminent.

Chinese crude oil exports have attracted worldwide attention since the first shipments were made to Japan in 1973, and many exaggerated predictions of their future magnitude were publicized by uncritical, mostly Japanese, observers. Although the exports to Japan jumped from a mere one mmt in 1973 to 8.2 mmt in 1975, critical analyses concluded that China's future export potential is limited.⁷

In 1976, Japan tried again to negotiate at least a five-year agreement for gradually increasing imports, but the two organizations engaged in the transactions—the Japan-China Oil Import Council and the International Oil Trading Company—were, for the third year running, unsuccessful; they settled finally for the total amount of 6.1 mmt at \$12.65 a barrel. Imports for 1977 were set at 5.4-6.2 mmt at \$13.50 a barrel. There are several reasons for this continuing decline: sluggish Japanese demand, some undesirable characteristics of the exported crudes, rapidly expanding Chinese domestic needs and the political uncertainty in Peking. There is no doubt that the Chinese are interested in selling more crude oil—and also natural gas—to diversify their exports and to earn foreign exchange, but it will still take time before any long-term agreements are concluded with Japan and other interested Asian importers.

POWER GENERATION

The NCNA released the figures for the first quarter and the first half year production increases of 1976 (18.2 and 17.6 percent respectively) but no claim was made for the whole year. Assuming that the growth rate equalled the long-term exponential trend (about 13 percent since 1966), total 1976 production would have reached about 138 billion kwh, with 78 percent originating in thermal power stations and the rest in hydro stations.

Certainly the most interesting news concerning thermal power generation was the disclosure of the successful operation of China's first 300-megawatt (MW) turbogenerator.⁸ The unit is part of the Wangting power station on the bank of Grand Canal in Kiangsu. Actually, the set entered experimental operation in September, 1974, after 15 months of installation work, but it reached its full capacity only at the beginning of 1976. It has a water-cooled stator and rotor and is claimed to be both lighter and more efficient than similar units of foreign manufacture. The second 300 MW turbo-

generator was installed in Wangting station just before the end of 1976.

New large fossil-fueled units were installed in many provinces across China: two 200 MW sets in the Chaoyang station in the mountains of western Liaoning, the third 125 MW turbogenerator in Shantung (Laiwu), the first 125 MW sets in Anhwei (Huainan station) and Hunan (Hsintushan station), another 125 MW unit in Hopei (Taoho in Tangshan), and a 50 MW unit in Fukien.

No large hydroelectric stations comparable to those of the Huang Ho cascade—Liuchiahsia, Yenkuochia, Papanhsia, Chingtunghsia and Sanmenhsia, which entered operation in 1973-1975—were completed in 1976, but the construction of small hydro stations continued at a brisk pace. There are now some 64,000 of these small or medium-sized installations (the average installed capacity is just over 40 kw), compared with less than 7,000 a decade ago. Most of the small stations are, naturally, in the rainy south—Kwangtung has the largest number (nearly 13,000), followed by Szechwan, Kweichow and Hunan—but many have been built recently in the dry north (Kansu has 400 stations; the total installed capacity in Honan has topped 100 MW) and even in Sinkiang and Tibet (Lhasa municipality has nearly 40).⁹

It is, of course, obvious that such small installations cannot be relied on to deliver steady base load. Recently released figures for Kwangtung, Honan and several localities in Hupeh and Kiangsi show that the typical utilization of small hydro stations is often as low as 1,200 hours per installed kilowatt annually, and typically around 2,700 hours, which makes the plants only intermittent sources of power. Nevertheless, the small hydro stations are the essential means of basic electrification in China's countryside; more than one-third of all communes and over half of all production brigades now produce local power for small industries, food processing, and some household lighting. Small hydro stations are sound economically and environmentally (numerous reservoirs act as very useful storage facilities for water in the dry north and as flood preventors in the humid south) and, as attested by the first nationwide meeting convened by the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power in the spring of 1976, their further expansion is very desirable.

China has made also some initial progress in an innovative form of power generation—geothermal applications. A small station, the third installation of its kind

in China, has entered commercial production in Huichang spa (Ninghsiang county, Hunan). Like the two older small plants (located in Kwangtung and Hopei) Huichang's 300 kw unit works with an indirect cycle based on hot water; however, preparations are under way to build the country's first direct cycle geothermal station in Yangpaching steam field in Tibet, which was discovered during the interdisciplinary survey of Chinghai-Tibet plateau by the Peking University geothermal group.

BIOGAS AND SOLAR ENERGY

The Chinese have world primacy not only in the exploitation of small-scale water resources but also in the utilization of organic wastes and plant residues for the production of a clean and versatile fuel. Biogas (the Chinese prefer the term marsh gas) is a mixture of roughly two-thirds methane, one-third carbon dioxide and traces of hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen and nitrogen, which originates in the controlled anaerobic fermentation of animal dung, night soil, pieces of vegetation, garbage and waste water. It can be produced in sealed, insulated containers ranging in size from a few cubic meters to industrial facilities drawing on wastes from animal feedlots or cities.

A typical Chinese biogas digester has 10-15 cubic meters and with proper care it can supply a family of five with sufficient gas for cooking and rudimentary lighting.¹⁰ Because the anaerobic fermentation requires steady warm temperatures (around 35° C inside the digester) most of the containers have been built in the warmer and more equable climates of southern China. Szechwan Basin has the world's largest concentration of biogas digesters in the world: in December, 1976, there were nearly two million units, with several hundred thousand under construction. The production of biogas is spreading to other southern provinces and to many northern localities, where it can be used on a seasonal basis; the total number of containers of all sizes throughout China topped four million in 1976.

Direct tapping of solar energy is still very scattered and limited. Reports during 1976 mentioned the use of small parabolic solar stoves for water boiling and cooking in Kiangsu, Hopei and Honan, the manufacture of a cheap folding solar stove in Kansu, and the installation of larger glass solar water heaters for public baths in Peking and in Lhasa.

ENERGY CONSUMPTION

China's aggregate consumption of commercial primary energy (i.e., fossil fuels and hydroelectricity) in 1976 approached 450 mmt of coal equivalent, a somewhat smaller increase than consumption increase the previous year (table 1). Nearly two-thirds of the total energy is supplied by coal, slightly over one-fifth by crude oil and some 13 percent by natural gas; hydro-

⁹More details on the regional distribution of small hydro stations can be found in Smil, "Intermediate Energy Technology in China," *World Development*, vol. 4, nos. 10-11 (November, 1976); pp. 931-933.

¹⁰For technical description of biogas generation in China see Smil, "Intermediate Energy Technology in China," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, vol. 33, no. 2 (February, 1977), pp. 28-31.

TABLE 1: Production and Consumption of Primary Energy in China, 1974-1976
(All figures are in million metric tons of coal equivalent)

	Production					Exports	Consumption
	Raw Coal	Crude Oil	Natural Gas	Hydroenergy	Total		
1974	251	85	47	3	386	9	377
1975	275	98	53	4	430	15	415
1976	283	111	60	4	458	13	445

Sources: 1974—Vaclav Smil, *China's Energy*, Tables 6.1 and 6.2, pp. 138 and 140; 1975, 1976—author's estimates based on Chinese growth claims (see note 4).

energy, though locally important, is of only small significance on the national scale. In per capita terms, this consumption translates into at least 460 kilograms (using J. S. Aird's 1976 mid-year estimate of 964 million favored also by the Central Intelligence Agency) or as much as 520 kilograms of coal equivalent (dividing by the figure of 853 million derived from the provincial population totals released by Peking during 1976).¹¹ The higher estimate is approximately twice the amount of commercial energy consumed per capita a decade ago, and it is more than double the current usage of energy in India.

OTHER ENERGY SOURCES

In China, as in most large developing nations, the figures for commercial energy consumption do not convey the complete picture. Unlike the developed countries, where hard human and animal labor has been almost completely displaced by machines and where plant fuels—firewood and crop by-products—are only insignificant sources of energy, biomass energies and animate power are a continuing necessity in the third world.

Thus the Chinese are currently using some 140 million cubic meters of wood and 180 mmt of crop residues as household fuel for cooking and heating, an equivalent of about 150 mmt of bituminous coal.¹² When these fuels are added to the commercial consumption per capita, energy use rises to between 620 and 700 kilograms per capita.

China's 120 million draft animals deliver at least 22 trillion kilocalories of useful energy annually, and more than 40 trillion kilocalories of useful work were con-

tributed in 1976 by the country's vast population. Mass farmland capital construction—terracing, stone and earth works, field leveling, irrigation, canal digging and maintenance, construction of wells and water reservoirs—reached an unprecedented scale in the winter and spring of 1975-1976, with the participation of 150 million people across China. Similar effort was mounted during the winter and spring of 1976-1977, with more than half the total labor force engaged in many provinces.

As for sectoral consumption, the pattern set by the late 1950's is slowly changing.¹³ Industrial uses (including stock and military demands) are still by far most important, roughly accounting for half the total; the residential and commercial sector uses slightly over one-fourth and power generation about ten percent of primary energy; transportation consumes less than ten percent of fossil fuels and the conversion of rail transport to more efficient diesel and electric locomotives will, in fact, reduce a sizable part of this usage. Although the most widespread means of mechanical human transportation is the bicycle (there are now more than 60 million bicycles in China), buses and trolley buses are also being produced in steadily increasing numbers.

Consumption in agriculture has tripled in absolute—and doubled in relative—terms since 1966, but it still accounts for no more than about five percent of commercial energy. Although it seems very doubtful that the "basic mechanization" of Chinese agriculture will be accomplished as planned (that is, by 1980), much higher energy inputs into farm production—directly in the form of fossil fuels and electricity, and indirectly in the form of machinery, fertilizers, pesticides and hybrid seeds—will be the key ingredient of the country's development strategy. ■

¹¹The status of population estimates for China is summarized in Leo A. Orleans, "China's Population: Can the Contradictions Be Resolved?" in *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975), pp. 69-80; new provincial figures are listed in "Provincial Population Figures," *Current Scene*, vol. 14, no. 11 (November, 1976), pp. 16-19.

¹²Bituminous (hard coal) equivalent is used to convert different fuels to a common denominator: one kilogram of coal equivalent has about 7,000 kilocalories.

¹³For details on China's sectoral energy uses see Smil, *China's Energy*, pp. 144-158 and CIA, *op. cit.*, table 9, p. 33.

Vaclav Smil, a specialist in the field of energetics, is the author of *China's Energy—Achievements, Problems, Prospects* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), *Energy and the Environment—A Long-Range Forecasting Study* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1974) and numerous articles on Chinese as well as global energetics.

"Assuming a continuation of the present leadership, the economy will gradually move in the direction of the four modernizations along a road resembling orthodox neo-Stalinist socialism, implemented by plans, rules, regulations, labor discipline, hierarchies, material incentives, and a large bureaucracy."

The Chinese Economy after the "Gang of Four"

BY JAN S. PRYBYLA

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IN HIS January, 1975, political report to the Fourth National People's Congress, the late Premier Chou En-lai called for the modernization of China's agriculture, industry, national defense, and scientific research—the so-called "Four Modernizations" intended to propel the country into the twenty-first century.

Premier Chou [now almost invariably referred to as the "beloved"] looked into research work personally. He pointed out: "This matter must not be delayed any longer."¹

Chou was right. Under Mao Tse-tung, especially during Mao's declining years when the radical coterie around him gained influence in the councils of the party and the state, modernization was neglected. The Cultural Revolution, especially, made a shambles of higher education and basic research. Regardless of its short-range and sociological (anti-elitist) merits, the reform endangered China's longer-term prospects of becoming a modern industrial power. Attempts on the part of less ideologically turned-on leaders (e.g., the unfortunate Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who fell not once but twice) to reshuffle priorities and focus on planning, production, productivity, labor discipline, science, technology and expertise were resisted by those nearer to Mao's heart. The radicals denounced such attempts as revisionist maneuvers by capitalist-roaders to push the erroneous line of "productive forces" at the expense of the primacy of correct "redness."

¹"Chinese Academy of Sciences Holds Conference on High Energy Physics," New China News Agency (NCNA) (Peking), April 3, 1977, in *Survey of People's Republic of China Press (SPRCP)* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), no. 6318, April 13, 1977, p. 62.

²"Shanghai Newsmen Denounce Journal Controlled by 'Gang of Four,'" NCNA (Shanghai), March 27, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6313, April 4, 1977, p. 17.

³Wu Chia-fu, "Strive to Achieve Democracy in Party Life," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), February 23, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6314, April 6, 1977, p. 39.

⁴Hung K'o, "'Philosophy' of Animals," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), January 26, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6298, March 14, 1977, p. 13; and K'ou Ch'u-shih, "Saber-Rattling Sinister Counter-Revolutionary Gang," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), February 17, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6313, April 4, 1977, p. 8.

⁵See my "The Chinese Economic Model," *Current History*, vol. 69, no. 408 (September, 1975), pp. 80-84, 102-103.

The radicals, led by Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing and three other characters, Wang Hung-wei, Yao Wen-yuan, and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (all of whom came into prominence during the headier days of the Cultural Revolution), had a favorite literary outlet in Shanghai—a journal, *Study and Criticism*, edited under the imprint of the leftist Fudan University. This "journal spread fallacies like the statement, 'the old chaps are no longer of any use'."² The old chaps included the beloved Chou En-lai, the "wise leader" Hua Kuo-feng, and many other veteran cadres at central and local levels, including some powerful army brass.

However, in early October, 1976, one month or so after the death of Mao, the four radicals fell out of the saddle, and the old chaps are in power. There is an ancient political principle that says: "Woe to the vanquished!" So the Chinese people were soon informed that the "Four Pests," as the fallen radicals were called (or the "Gang of Four"), dialecticians that they were, "transposed black and white and confused right and wrong. . . . They described right as wrong and wrong as right."³ All along, it now turns out, the wife of the late Chairman was "a parasite and a vampire," and the four pests were "freaks and monsters with human faces" who never suppressed such apparently widespread phenomena in new China as "wild ambitions. . . speculation and commercial machinations. . . beating, smashing, and looting. . . embezzling of public property and violation of social law and order." On the contrary, it is charged, they took to all this "like flies taking to filth."⁴

Abstracting from semantic flourishes and revolutionary breaches of etiquette, what has all this got to do with the economy? A great deal.

THE NEW SOCIALIST MAN

The Maoist blueprint for a new society, including Mao's vision of China's future economic system, hinges on the emergence of that most important of all the so-called "socialist new-born things": the new socialist man.⁵ Without that selfless, collectivized person, wholly dedicated to the service of the people, ignoring the sugar-coated bullets of material reward and non-material privilege, firm and resolute in proletarian class stand, the Maoist model has no chance.

The new man is necessary because, dissolved in the mass, he controls himself by an internalized ethic of work, is satisfied with a job well done for the community and does not expect reward, especially personal, differentiated, material recompense that would set him apart from others. All this eliminates the need for supervisory bureaucracies that are the bane of socialist systems, obviates the danger of new elites rising on the ashes of the old, and makes capital accumulation a cinch, because without compulsion (taxes, high prices, low wages) consumption is reduced and productivity is increased. The invisible hand of the market, which, in the classical economic schema, promotes social harmony through the pleasure-maximizing behavior of freely competing individual economic men, is replaced by the invisible hand of collective consciousness, the dissolution of the individual and his complete socialization.

In the new socialist man's absence, Mao's vision runs the risk of turning into bureaucratic state capitalism *à la Russe*, with quaint local colorations and Chinese cultural infusions. So far, despite some progress in putting together this robot, the process of creation has not much advanced. The new socialist man may be as much an abstraction as was the economic man of nineteenth century English classical economics. Under Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the probability that the new socialist man will survive early infancy is not good. Symptomatic of the subtle changes that have taken place in the ideological atmosphere of China since October, 1976, is the fact that statements urging the masses to emulate heroes like Wang Chin-hsi, the "iron man" of Taching, are made today primarily in the name of increased production, that is, for a specific (neo-Stakhanovite) economic purpose rather than, as formerly, as a general principle. The spirit of self-denial (meaning low personal consumption) and hard work exhibited by the resurrected models is seen, in the context of today's labor emulation campaigns, as a necessary means to capital accumulation at high rates, rather than as character-forming in its own right. "To increase the speed of development of our national economy is a task that brooks no delay."⁶

The hero Lei Feng, brought to life for the third or

fourth time, is now offered to all young people as an example of discipline and submission to orders of the duly constituted party authorities. By means of a discreet shift of emphasis, the image of the new Chinese socialist man is very gradually, almost imperceptibly, beginning to resemble the composite picture of a model Soviet worker in Stalin's days. It is now said that the four gangsters regarded the broad masses as "lambs" and "muddle-headed fools with no political consciousness."⁷

It should not be suggested that there are no virtuous socialist men in the new China; obviously there are. Many young people are highly motivated, responsive to instructions, idealistic, honest, loyal and patriotic. Their collective consciousness is, no doubt, high. But what is one to make of the repeated references to those in that other China, which, even if one discounts the excessive language and alarmist rhetoric to which the Chinese are addicted, appear to be many more than "a handful"? Of course, there is a considerable element of exaggeration in the current denunciation of evil-doing in China, but denunciation does point to a situation less rosy than that depicted by American travelers, concerned Asian scholars, and concerned Hollywood performers.

The Gang of Four had agents everywhere. It dominated the cultural life of the country, the press, and other media. It had hirelings in practically every ministry and government department, nay, in every factory and on every farm. It apparently led a mass movement. Most importantly, the gang had the ear of the Chairman. Without Mao's tacit approval, indeed active encouragement, the four pests could never have become a locust plague.

And what is one to think of the perspicacity of a Chairman who allowed himself to be thus led by the nose? Who were these people at the very top, and who were their followers? Let us listen to the victors' description of them:

"New and old counter-revolutionaries, thugs who beat, smashed and looted, embezzlers and thieves, so-called veteran cadres who sold themselves to the gang, hack writers, time-serving informers, monsters and freaks, riffraff and other dregs of society.

Wang Hung-wen, who was personally elevated by Mao to a high station, "embezzled and stole like mad," and led "a decadent life" on the proceeds.⁸ Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, "indulged herself all the time in gluttony and pleasure-seeking and in doing mischief."⁹ In sections of the country that the gang dominated, the masses were corrupted. In Wenchow, for example,

there emerged the serious phenomenon of division of land for individual farming, unbridled black market, polarization, and disintegration of the collective economy, thus causing Wenchow, which was a prefecture with grain to spare, to become a prefecture short of grain. Some factories and enterprises were forced into stopping work and suspending production, and there emerged underground factories and underground contract teams.¹⁰

⁶Hua Kuo-feng's Speech at the National Conference on Learning from Teaching in Industry (May 9, 1977), *Peking Review*, no. 21, May 20, 1977, p. 13.

⁷Fang Chih, "The Spirit of Lei Feng Will Shine Forever," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), March 6, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6299, March 15, 1977, p. 39.

⁸"A Sinister Cabal of New and Old Counter-Revolutionaries," *Peking Review*, no. 19, May 6, 1977, pp. 37-38.

⁹"Dirty Underhand Tricks for Appropriating Other People's Merits to Oneself and Seizing Power," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), March 26, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6318, April 13, 1977, p. 51.

¹⁰"A Shocking Scene of Counter-Revolutionary Restoration in Wenchow," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), March 22, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6313, April 4, 1977, p. 3. Some of the masses "went to sea to join the enemy" (p. 6).

In brief, "corruption, embezzlement, speculation, and manipulation" were at work in the ranks of the masses. Apparently, man in China will not soon completely "return to himself as a *social* [i.e., human] being," in the words of Karl Marx.¹¹ It is going to be a long march: a march of ten thousand *li* and more.

LABOR DISCIPLINE

What happened was this. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) was a time of controlled anarchy, when many social structures were torn down or severely weakened. The work of tearing down was assigned to various sections of the popular masses, mainly to those young people whose career aspirations were being blocked by the increasingly rigid and stratified *status quo*. In a fundamental sense, the Cultural Revolution represented a massive and open class struggle within China's socialist order. One by-product of this was a relaxation of discipline, including work discipline, if only because—once order had been restored by the army—the power-holders at all levels were extremely wary, fearing that someone on the left would again goad the masses into action.

Moreover, the muted leadership struggle, which intensified after the Cultural Revolution and accelerated with the visible physical decline of Mao, was repeatedly injected into the very sinews of the economy. Campaign followed campaign, disrupting work schedules, causing confusion among cadres and workers, creating frictions and even strikes and physical fights. A campaign launched by one faction would be manipulated by the faction's opponents, redirected into a different channel, turned around again without definition, and with no end in sight. One can almost see the Chairman, waking up from one of his naps, saying to the factions: "You'd better be careful; don't let yourselves become a small faction of four. . . . Don't form factions. Those who will do so will fall."¹² In the meantime, output suffered; petty politics of the worst kind was constantly pumped into the economy.

During the Cultural Revolution many work rules and regulations were discarded because, the left alleged, they discriminated against the masses and were a cover-up for the capitalist-roaders' revisionist goals. As a result, labor discipline suffered. In addition to structural underemployment, a negative attitude toward labor developed. When they did turn up for work,

workers often quite simply did less work. Lifelong employment is almost guaranteed in China, and in the atmosphere of factional uncertainty, what manager would dare fire a loafer? Supervision became lax; supervisors themselves were politically and professionally supervised by elusive guardians of the ambiguous "correct" politics.

When I visited the No. 1 Machine Tools Plant in Shanghai in February, 1974, the machines there were all but covered with big character posters, at least one of them airing a personal gripe against the management. Jay Matthews reports that later this plant was swept by the cricket fad: young workers would sneak out into nearby fields, catch crickets, and enjoy watching the crickets fight on company time.¹³ When similar attitudes, only worse, gripped the railroads and the mines, freight was piled up, bottlenecks developed in the supply of raw materials, the flow of production was jammed. At one time in 1974-1975, the Hangchow area was gripped by labor disorders and railroad engine drivers refused to go into the area.

The controversy over rules and regulations in the management of enterprises [wrote the *Peking Review* blandly] has been going on since the start of the Great Cultural Revolution. . . . Some irrational rules and regulations came under fire and were abolished. . . . [However], the 'gang of four' [opposed] all rules and regulations. Chang Chun-chiao made this clear when he said: "It is necessary to set up enterprises that have no rules and regulations." Chaos resulted in many factories where rules and regulations were ignored or there were no rules and regulations to follow at all, discipline became lax, and production fell.¹⁴

If we allow for pathos, artistic embroidering, and the need to make things look really bad for the four pests, there was probably much cricketing going on at the bottom during the years of power struggle at the top. The new leadership's insistence on Taching as a national model for industry was related to the fact that Taching had been singled out by the gang as an operation which, by means of its strict rules and regulations, "upholds the bourgeois dictatorship over the working class."¹⁵

But there was more. Not only had the gang struggled against established managerial privilege with an almost *communard* and anarchist zeal, they had also actively encouraged labor unrest. "It is all right for production to go down," said the pests, "as long as we do a good job in revolution." "We would rather grow socialist weeds than plant capitalist seedlings," they said. "It is permissible that factories produce nothing at all" and "it does not matter if the farms reap nothing at harvest time." Worst of all, they said: "We would rather have a low socialist rate [of economic] growth than a high capitalist one."¹⁶

Stalin, everybody's hero in China, used to call this "economic sabotage." "They forbade us," complained the party committee secretary of the large Capital Iron and Steel Company of Peking, "to discuss the target

¹¹Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 135.

¹²*China Reconstructs*, June, 1977, p. 3.

¹³Jay Matthews, "Post-Mao Leaders Battle 'WPA Atmosphere' in Factories," *The Washington Post*, May 15, 1977, p. A12.

¹⁴Wang Che, "The 'Gang of Four' Pushed Anarchism," *Peking Review*, no. 14, April 1, 1977, pp. 23, 25.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁶Chi Wei, "How the 'Gang of Four' Opposed Socialist Modernization," *Peking Review*, no. 11, March 11, 1977, pp. 8-9.

of production, to carry out the inspection of products, to set [materials] consumption quota, and to practice cost accounting."¹⁷ As a result, steel in China, some observers note, has become something like a precious metal. At the very least,

agriculture and national defense are in need of iron and steel, and plants throughout the country are urgently waiting for us to produce more iron and steel of better quality. We cannot afford to wait for problems found in all sectors of the enterprise to be put in order before making great progress, but must realize great progress in the midst of great order.¹⁸

The restoration of great order is the salient objective of China's economic policy. I had encountered these leftist fanatics at universities, plants, and communes during my trip to China: ardent, young, touchy, and narrow types who tormented anyone who tried to manage a factory, farm or school or whatever. Organizational discipline is likely to get very Leninist in China for a while.

While undoubtedly there is a problem of labor discipline and labor unrest, it may not be as serious in its consequences as it is reported to be. After all, the Cultural Revolution was far more bumpy and scary, yet it made hardly a dent in China's growth rate. On the contrary, after a brief recuperative spell, the economy recovered, apparently revitalized by the shedding of various bureaucratic encrustations. The economy's foundations appear to be solid, and barring some monumental disaster the future looks promising, because the Chinese worker is usually able and conscientious. His current grievances are relatively modest, and can be resolved without important structural readjustments.

At the same time, it would be foolish to ignore the complaints of workers and managers in China. China's economy is at a crossroads. It is on the edge of a breakthrough into modernity, in agriculture and in many branches of industry.¹⁹ But the final thrust toward modernization could be jeopardized by ill-conceived policies and continued factional wrangling. Not all the bickering of the four pests was negative: some of it acted as a spur to reform creaky institutions. The fact that office-holders were kept on edge was all to the

good. Trouble arose when they were so upset that they could not make decisions. To give the four pests their due, they often acted as a needed stimulant, the nearest substitute a centrally planned, monoparty society can provide to take the place of the energizing forces of market competition and parliamentary democracy. The Soviet Union could use a few pests.

INCOMES

Pests or no pests, the Chinese economy must shortly address itself to the problem of low living standards. The industrial wage has not been raised in 20 years. Granted (although the evidence is not conclusive) that the consumer price level has remained comparatively stable, consumer goods (other than the most basic) carry high prices relative to the money incomes of workers and are, therefore, out of the workers' reach. After 20 years—good years, by and large, compared with prewar standards—the Chinese consumer is becoming dissatisfied with the narrow range of goods he can purchase with his pay. Many services are provided at what to Westerners look like nominal rates (primary and secondary education and health-medical services, for example), but when all is counted in, the rates are not so nominal after all.²⁰ Dissatisfaction leads to labor unrest and cutting corners on the job. To increase family disposable income, women have entered the labor force in large numbers in the last six years or so.

Personal savings are said to be rising rapidly, especially among the peasants. It is likely that some of these savings are earmarked for articles now unavailable or too expensive (there is no consumer credit in China to speak of); savings, therefore, may be forced savings, what the Russians euphemistically call "otlozhenny spros" (deferred demand). The average monthly income of an industrial worker is in the neighborhood of U.S.\$30, but the majority of China's workers earn substantially less than this. Peasants on the poorer communes earn perhaps \$6 a month from communal work (not counting income from private plots and subsidiary household activity, e.g., pig raising). Those living on above average communes make as much as \$20 a month. The living standards of the peasants have improved in the last 20 years, but they still have a long way to go. Living standards of urban populations have remained unchanged over these two decades; perhaps they declined a little because of the fall in the quality of the urban social wage. For example, urban doctors and medical facilities are being sent to the countryside either on a permanent or a rotating basis, with a consequent adverse effect on the quality and availability of medical care in the cities.

I have calculated that in order to buy a bicycle—the main means of intra-city conveyance other than travel on foot or by public transport—a skilled industrial worker would have to work between 440 and 620 hours; an unskilled industrial worker, 690-970 hours.²¹

¹⁷"Run Steel Industry by Grasping the Key Link to Bring About Great Order and Great Progress," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), March 23, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6314, April 6, 1977, p. 32.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

¹⁹I have in mind the intersectoral transformation of farm production in China which is taking place before our very eyes.

²⁰Professor Teh-wei Hu has shown that the rural cooperative medical service is not as cheap (for the people involved) as it looks. See his *An Economic Analysis of Cooperative Medical Services in the People's Republic of China* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1975).

²¹J. S. Prybyla, "Work Incentives in the People's Republic of China," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* [Review of world economics], vol. 112, no. 4, 1976, pp. 767-791.

To buy a small black and white television set, a real luxury, a skilled worker would have to put in 1,100 hours, and an unskilled one 1,720 hours. Of course, this living standard is better than the standard in many, probably most, countries of the "Third World." But, as the French say, "l'appétit vient en mangeant"—and the Chinese have eaten regularly if modestly ever since 1949. I do not see a consumer revolt threatening the foundations of the regime; but consumer resentment is growing.

This is probably most pronounced among the 20 million or more educated young people who have been settled permanently in the countryside in the last 10 years or so because there are no appropriate jobs for them in the cities. Interestingly, the mood of restlessness also pervades the better-off workers and peasants. Trouble has flared largely on the railways, in metallurgical plants, coal mines, and in places like the Westlake commune near Hangchow, where average personal earnings are among the highest in China. In an interesting conversation with several young escapees from China, the subject of living standards kept coming up. One of the young people said of the post-Mao era:

It appears to me that the people basically want two things: First, they want to see the policy of "four modernizations" implemented in order to raise the general standard of living and, in turn, to strengthen the unity and stability of the nation. Second, and in that order, they want democracy and freedom.²²

Democracy and freedom they will not achieve, but it is likely that the new regime of Hua Kuo-feng will be less sanctimonious than its predecessor about Spartan living standards for the masses, even though it will have to face some very tough choices between consumption and capital formation. Soon, perhaps without much fanfare, the bonus wage will probably be reinstituted. It is also probable that a general increase in the wage level will be decreed and wage differentials will be widened. Labor allocations will probably be made by means of these wage differentials rather than (as has been the case hitherto) through administrative order. All this, of course, carries many economic and ideological risks. The main ideological risk is "revisionism," in the Soviet sense of rampant, distorted (because underground) capitalism topped by a thick layer of parasitic bureaucrats living off the fat of the land. This was Mao's constant fear. The major economic risk is the extent to which rising consumption will adversely affect the four modernizations, at least in the short and medium run. The modernizations require large investment outlays and a measure of consumer restraint.

*See C. T. Hu's article in this issue.

²²Ta-ling Lee and Miriam London, "A Chinese Roundtable on the Passing of Mao," *Freedom at Issue*, no. 40, March-April, 1977, p. 8.

²³"National Conference Promotes Capital Construction," NCNA (Peking), April 3, 1977, in *SPRCP*, no. 6318, April 13, 1977, p. 59.

The relation between consumption and capital formation is not simple. Presumably, except in the state of pure Maoist grace, human nature responds positively to material incentives, which means that men work harder and more productively if they thus earn more money with which they can buy goods. Thus, higher consumption might translate itself into higher labor productivity and a larger output. It is also probable that within the next few years China will emerge as a significant exporter of oil, in which event she will earn substantial amounts of foreign exchange that could go a long way toward easing her present problems of purchasing up-to-date equipment from West Europe, Japan and the United States.

It is very likely that every effort will be made in the coming years to push the four modernizations. In other words, emphasis will be shifted from the do-it-yourself type of capital formation and mass innovation to the acquisition of capital embodying more sophisticated technology. Chances are good that China will become a more active trader in world markets and will be less reluctant to accept offers of long-term credit. We are told that "the pests" resisted the importation of advanced technology and complete plants. They called the leading comrades who arranged such foreign deals, "foreigners' slaves," "compradors" and "traitors." They also squandered scarce capital resources on "many high-standard, non-productive projects," such as "a Hollywood-type film producing center" in Shanghai.²³

HUMAN CAPITAL

The most serious problems exist on the educational front. The Cultural Revolution watered down the whole system of education and research to the intelligence level of the culturally underprivileged peasant. Higher education and basic research suffered the most.* While revivalist politics was injected into everything, it all but smothered learning. It was clear that the pre-Cultural Revolution schools and learned institutes, with their remnants of mandarinism and their borrowings from the Soviet prototype, were far from perfect; thus, in some respects the educational revolution was constructive. But the problems were overcorrected, and China's longer-term needs for highly skilled, well-educated people were sacrificed to political fads. Basic research is not visible. Perhaps it continues hidden somewhere in the wilds of Sinkiang or in tunnels under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. But it is certainly not carried on in the universities, which are still in shambles seven years

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“... in view of the fact that China wants to become a highly industrialized nation by the year 2000 and wants to become self-sufficient in food with a significant improvement in the diet and living standards of her citizens in the meantime, a population growth rate of 0.5 percent, like the rates achieved in West European countries, is a necessity.”

The Planned Birth Program in China

BY KUAN-I CHEN

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CHINA has often been used by various writers as a model in the category of countries with severe population pressure because she is confronted with the formidable task of feeding a huge population (roughly one-fifth of the world population), with only about seven percent of the world's cultivated land. However, some nations are even more heavily populated than China. For example, in 1969, the per capita cultivated land¹ was about 0.146 hectare for China, and only 0.073 hectare for South Korea and 0.055 hectare for Japan. In addition China is richly endowed with non-agricultural resources in general, including minerals, fuels and potential hydroelectric power, while Japan is very much deficient in these resources. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is aware of population pressure and constraints (man-land ratio) in China's agriculture and has made enormous efforts to increase food output per hectare and to limit fertility.

During the period 1949-1974 foodgrains output grew somewhat faster, on the average, than the population. The foodgrains output for 1949 was accepted by Western sources as 108 million metric tons (MMT)

¹The population figure and statistics on cultivated land use in China are 740 million and 108 million hectares, respectively. The source of data for South Korea and Japan is United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), *Production Yearbook*, 1970.

²Neville Maxwell, "Increased Grain Production in China," *The New York Times*, December 26, 1975, p. 31C. Other sources put the 1974 output at 255-260 MMT; this gives an average annual growth rate of 3.5-3.6 percent. Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Review, 1975," in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 10, 1975), pp. 328-329; Dwight H. Perkins, "Constraints Influencing China's Agricultural Performance," *op. cit.*, p. 351.

³Leo A. Orleans, "China's Population Figures: Can the Contradictions be Resolved," *Studies in Family Planning* (Chicago: Population Council, February, 1976), tables 1, 2 and 3, pp. 54-55.

⁴A discussion of the prospect of increasing foodgrains output in China was presented in Kuan-I Chen, "Agricultural Modernization and Industrialization in China," *Current History*, September, 1976 and Kuan-I Chen, "An Assessment of China's Foodgrains Supplies in 1980," *Asian Survey*, October, 1976, pp. 931-47.

and the revised output figure for 1974, as reported by the Chinese, was 275 MMT.² Thus, the average annual growth rate of foodgrains came to about 3.8 percent for the period 1949-1974. (The average annual growth rate of total agricultural production was approximately 3.9 percent for the same period.) Because of the recurring weather cycle, the annual growth rate of output, however, tended to fluctuate sharply. The population growth rate increased rapidly to a rate close to 2.5 percent annually during the early part of 1949-1974, but the rate has gradually declined and is believed by some China-watchers to be below 2.0 percent in recent years.³ Therefore, for the period 1949-1974 as a whole, the foodgrains output (or agricultural production) has grown somewhat more rapidly than the population, allowing some margin of surplus for a mild improvement in the diet of the average Chinese. However, any significant improvement in the future diet of the average Chinese depends not only on a continuous increase in the yield per hectare but also on the reduction of the annual population increase to a rate of 1.0 percent or lower.⁴

Since the establishment of the republic in 1949, the population policy of China has gone through several phases. Its fluctuations are likely to be influenced more by economic and political dynamics than by attitudes toward birth control. From 1949 until mid-1953, both state and party officials optimistically interpreted Marxist precepts to mean that an abundant population was an asset to China's economic development. They believed that the abolition of the Chinese semi-feudalistic system and foreign exploitation and dominance would remove the major barriers to rapid economic development. Any weakness in capital equipment and advanced technology could be compensated for by human labor and creativity if the labor force were effectively motivated and mobilized. China's economy would rise rapidly to give China the status of an advanced industrial power with the full involvement of the masses in the task of economic construction. Therefore, without question, China's "population problem"—if one existed—could be solved with confidence.

The result of the 1953 census revealed a population

of 586 million instead of the anticipated (or often quoted) figure of 400 million or 450 million. A reassessment of population growth in relation to foodgrains production was apparently made. According to the reconstructed Chinese official data, foodgrains production increased at a declining rate during 1949-1957.⁵ The annual increase was 16 percent for 1950, 8 percent for 1951 and 14 percent for 1952. The annual increase for 1953 through 1957 was 2 percent, 2 percent, 9 percent, 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively. Of course, the rapid rate of increase in 1950-1952 was partly due to the cessation of war and to a rise in production to its existing capacity and technology. Some planners began to realize that foodgrains output had reached a plateau under traditional agricultural method and inputs and that any further steady increase in output must come from a rapid expansion in modern agricultural inputs. This requires strong support from industry and the transformation of agro-techniques.

The annual population growth rate for the pre-1949 decades was estimated by various sources as ranging from 0.48 percent to 1.13 percent.⁶ The official data for 1949-1957 showed an average growth rate of 2.0 percent for 1949-1952 and 2.3 percent for 1953-1957. For the period 1949-1957 as a whole, the increase in foodgrains output exceeded the increase in population. However, the reduction in the annual growth rate of foodgrains (or the possibility that a plateau in production had been reached) combined with a rising population growth rate from a larger-than-hitherto-anticipated population base (1953 census) would undoubtedly erode the optimism of those more cautious leaders or officials with regard to an easy solution to the food and population problem.

FAMILY PLANNING CONSIDERED

There is some evidence that family planning was being seriously discussed in China at the top government levels as early as 1952 and that there was disagreement on the most appropriate strategy.⁷ On the one hand, some leaders and officials argued for family planning programs for the purpose of maintaining health and strengthening women's rights. Others be-

lieved that a large population was essential to a labor-intensive economy that was compensating for shortages of capital equipment and technology. At the 1954 National People's Congress, the topic of population was mentioned publicly for the first time. During the seventh national congress of the Chinese Communist party, in March, 1955, a statement gave limited support to birth control. By 1956, a recognizable birth control program began and continued steadily to 1958.

The program was conventional in its approach and experimental in nature. Therefore, there were considerable differences in the organization and control, the diffusion strategy and the contraceptive methods in both rural and urban areas among the various regions. By and large, the program was controlled centrally and hierarchically and was pushed more intensively in the urban areas. Propaganda campaigns were mounted and free contraceptive devices were distributed. Communication channels for propaganda included newspaper articles, exhibits, public lectures, and discussions, motion pictures, books and pamphlets, traveling propaganda teams, and radio and loudspeakers. However, penetration in the rural areas, where 75-80 percent of the population lives, was very limited. The message of the program was mainly economic and medical and political content was lacking.⁸ Medical personnel urged the target population to practice planned birth out of self-interest: producing too many children is unhealthy and medically risky for the mother; early marriage would slow one's economic and academic advancement; fewer children would raise one's living standard. The impact of this program on the birth rate was probably very minimal, since an effective organization network for family planning had not been established in the rural areas.

A number of other problems were associated with this program: the poor quality of contraceptive devices, peasant resentment of outside interference in their lives and of exclusion from the decision-making process, disagreement among administrators, the doubts and fears of the public about the effect of contraceptives on health, and so on. In short, the population, under the prevailing social and administrative conditions, was far from adequately motivated and was not prepared for mass participation in the family planning program.

During the 1958-1959 Great Leap Forward campaign, actively led by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, there was a noticeable absence of family planning publicity in the Chinese press; for all practical purposes the program had probably ceased to function. This temporary interruption in the program has often been explained by China-watchers in terms of the political difference between the promoters of family planning and the Maoists, who held an exaggerated confidence in institutional reorganization and mass participation as a solution to all economic problems.

⁵Chu-Yuan Cheng, "Economic Fluctuations on the Chinese Mainland, 1949-72," *Issues and Studies*, April 1974, p. 37.

⁶K. C. Yeh and Carolyn Lee, "Communist China's Population Problem in the 1980's," *Issues and Studies*, March 1974, pp. 15-16, 20.

⁷Leo A. Orleans, *Every Fifth Child: The Population of China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 43, and Raymond Morrison, Jr., and Jack D. Salmon, "Population Control in China: A Reinterpretation," *Asian Survey*, September, 1973, pp. 874-877.

⁸John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China," in Joint Economic Committee of U.S. Congress, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 18, 1972), pp. 255, 273.

This may be an oversimplified interpretation for a very complex situation. Actually, Mao as early as 1957, reportedly indicated that zero population growth was an absolute necessity and pleaded for a more effective planned birth program.⁹ Thus Mao and his supporters were probably dissatisfied with the campaign, for both political and practical reasons, especially since the rural area had not been reached. Since the program was not working well anyway, Maoists saw in the Great Leap an opportunity to drop this planned birth program and to seek alternative methods for reducing the population growth rate. Not only did the campaign not reach the rural population to any extent; in those rural areas it reached, the peasants by and large did not respond to the educational channels employed, which were basically part of an urban-oriented public health network. Nor did they respond to the message that emphasized medical reasons for limiting population growth. For these reasons, the group associated with Mao decided to concentrate on attitude manipulation and the development of a program better adapted to the rural population.¹⁰

The years 1959 through 1961 were years of poor weather. In addition, some economic practices during the Great Leap Forward tended to dislocate the overall operation of the economy. Policy differences within the Chinese leadership were marked. By 1962, a new economic policy was formally introduced to rectify the chaotic situation resulting from the Great Leap Campaign; at the same time, Mao had retreated to a much less active role in the nation's affairs. The new economic policy was apparently a compromise between the Soviet type of approach to economic development and the policies of the Great Leap Forward. In connection with this new policy, a modified family planning program was introduced, which supposedly took into account the successes and failures of the 1954-1957 program.

Nevertheless, this second program repeated earlier efforts, especially in terms of administration, control, and the lack of local participation in management. However, for the first time the formal education system was utilized. Sex education became part of the public

school curriculum, and family planning methods were discussed at the college level.¹¹ Mobile health teams were sent to rural areas, and family planning techniques and socioeconomic benefits were emphasized. In addition to the contraceptive methods used commonly during the first campaign, the intrauterine device (IUD) was popularized. Furthermore, an element of coercion was introduced into the otherwise voluntary family planning approach.¹² Pressures for compliance with family planning efforts included cloth rationing, close surveillance of families with more than three children, cutback in welfare for a fourth child, threat to status and occupation, and economic sanctions on early marriages.

This approach brought some successes in urban centers and among party members and official cadres. But the program was again ineffective in rural areas where the population problem was most crucial. The factors that favored the urban centers included the more extensive and effective health care network in the cities, the higher rate of political participation of the urban population, and the greater degree of political consciousness of party and mass organizations in the urban areas. By 1962, officials (Mao included) were so critical of the strategy and tactics of this second campaign that an alternative program, the Socialist Education Movement, was initiated. This movement provided an alternative method of family planning.

To offset the highly centralized methods and a few somewhat coercive measures of the campaign aimed principally at rural areas, this movement emphasized the direct involvement of the peasants in the design and implementation of family planning. It also adopted a few new features: it relied more on various women's organizations to lead; it provided increased job opportunities for women as an added incentive to practice family planning; it renewed the emphasis on political education, participation and control; and it reorganized the health care network to serve as an alternative educational channel for information in family planning. Because the emphasis of this movement was on the political and economic emancipation of women as well as their involvement in the implementation of planned births, the response of women to this new drive was reported to be enthusiastic. Mao and others perceived this response as an indication of future direction for effective family planning.¹³ On June 26, 1965, Mao therefore issued a directive stating that the health services henceforth would concentrate on rural areas. This indicated that the reorganized health services would eventually serve as an alternative educational institution in which instruction and practice would aim at limiting fertility in rural areas.¹⁴

The Cultural Revolution overshadowed and disrupted the family planning program, but the program was not abandoned. As a matter of fact, important ground work was laid for a future campaign during this period. Steroid oral contraceptives were tested

⁹The New York Times, June 13, 1957; John S. Aird, "Population Problems, Theories and Policies," *China: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 452.

¹⁰Morrison and Salmon, *op. cit.*, pp. 877-79.

¹¹Chi-Ping Tung and H. Evans, *The Thought Revolution* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1966), p. 157.

¹²John Aird, "Population Problems, Theories and Policies," p. 460; *Nan-fang jih-pao*, October 27, 1963; *Chung-Kuo fu-nu*, April 1, 1963.

¹³Phyllis T. Piotrow, ed., *Population and Family Planning in the People's Republic of China*, Victor-Bostrom Fund, 1971.

¹⁴John N. Hawkins, "Family Planning, Education, and Health Care Delivery in the People's Republic of China: Implications for Educational Alternatives," *Comparative Education Review*, June, 1976, p. 159.

in the second half of the 1960's, and their large-scale promotion began in 1969.¹⁵ The public health services network, including the training of "barefoot" doctors, was beginning to be extended to communes. As the turmoils associated with the Cultural Revolution finally subsided, a new family planning education program was inaugurated to accompany a reorganized health care delivery system, the core of China's planned birth program for the 1970's.

The Chinese population policy of the 1970's shows a strong commitment to the planning of births. A 1971 State Council Directive (No. 51) shows the spirit for the 1970's:

Planned birth is an important matter which Chairman Mao has advocated for many years, and demands serious attention by the leading comrades at the various [administrative] levels except for the thinly populated national minority and certain other areas; the leading comrades at each level must strengthen leadership, conducting penetrating propaganda and education, so that late marriage and planning of birth become voluntary behavior on the part of the broad masses in cities and countryside, and strive hard to accomplish outstanding results during the Fourth Five-Year-Plan period [1971-1975].¹⁶

The aims of the planned birth program since 1971 include a number of goals, including late marriage, with the suggestive ages 25-28 for men and 23-25 for women in the cities and a year or two earlier in the rural areas; childbirth spacing, with five-year intervals after the first child; and the inculcation of small-family norms, with two children in urban areas and three in rural areas—regardless of sex. Although no specific targets of population growth rate on a national level were established by the 1971 directive, a visitor to China was told by numerous cadres in charge of planned birth at various levels that provincial administrations had set targets of reducing natural growth rate to 10 per 1,000 in cities and 15 per 1,000 in the countryside by 1975.¹⁷

ORGANIZATION OF PLANNED BIRTH SERVICES

Since the facilities for planned birth services are

¹⁵Carl Djerassi, "Fertility Limitation through Contraceptive Steroids in the PRC," *Studies in Family Planning*, January, 1974, pp. 13-30.

¹⁶—, "Some Observations on Current Fertility Control in China," *The China Quarterly*, January/March, 1974, pp. 40-62.

¹⁷Pi-Chao Chen, "The People's Republic of China in Family Planning Programs: World Review 1974," *Studies in Family Planning* (Chicago: The Population Council, August, 1975), p. 321.

¹⁸Pi-Chao Chen and Ann E. Miller, "Lessons from the Chinese Experience: China's Planned Birth Program and Its Transferability," *Studies in Family Planning*, October, 1975, p. 354.

¹⁹Chen, *op. cit.*, August, 1975, p. 321; Victor W. Sidel and Ruth Sidel, "The Delivery of Medical Care in China," *Scientific American*, April, 1974, pp. 19-27.

²⁰Anibal Faundes and Tapani Luukkainen, "Health and Family Planning in the People's Republic of China," *Studies in Family Planning*, July, 1972, pp. 165-76.

closely associated with health service facilities, a description of the organization of family planning services must start with the political structure in urban and rural areas and their general health services. Administratively, cities are divided into districts, which are subdivided into wards. The wards are again divided into residents' lane units and each lane is further divided into neighborhoods of between 15 and 40 households. In smaller cities, the district level is omitted. A rural area is divided into communes, which consist of 10 to 25 production brigades. Each brigade is organized into a number of production teams. The team is the production and accounting unit and consists of between 30 and 50 households. In both urban and rural areas, the administration of each unit at all levels is carried out by a Revolutionary Committee. One of the subcommittees of the Revolutionary Committee is the planned birth committee, which is responsible for promoting the planned birth program by organizing local education and motivation sessions and by overseeing the delivery of planned birth services at its level. Because there is a planned birth subcommittee at each level, there is a corresponding health service unit at each level to provide the facilities and services for family planning. Planned birth services are therefore integrated with the health delivery system.¹⁸

In cities, the health services for residents in neighborhood units are provided by a district hospital and by small health stations called street and lane health stations. Each station serving neighborhood residents is usually staffed by a few "native" doctors (paramedical personnel) who are responsible for treating simple diseases and emergencies and providing preventive health care. The task of the "native" doctors in family planning is to distribute contraceptives, mostly oral, to patients and to refer applicants for induced abortion or sterilization to district hospitals. Each "native" doctor is assisted by a number of volunteer housewives, who deliver oral and other contraceptives from the station to married women of reproductive age in their neighborhood. Both "native" doctors and volunteer housewives are associated with the sub-unit of the committee on planned birth work. The committee is normally chaired by a female cadre member who is also a member of the neighborhood revolutionary committee.

In the communes, each production team has a health station, which is generally staffed by two "barefoot" doctors (the rural counterpart of urban "native" doctors).¹⁹ "Barefoot" doctors are integrated members of the community in which they work. They are responsible for vaccinations, environmental health, first aid in emergencies, the evaluation of the seriousness of various diseases, the treatment of minor illnesses and the transfer of some patients to better trained personnel. Each production brigade has a health center that is staffed by one or more assistant doctors plus "barefoot" doctors, midwives, nurses and medical assistants.

A center has no beds for hospitalization and serves only as an outpatient clinic. Each commune has a small hospital with an outpatient clinic and beds for hospitalization, but in small communes or communes of more remote backward regions, there may be no hospital at the commune level.

The committee on planned birth work in the commune is often headed by the chairman (or vice chairman) of the commune's revolutionary committee or by a female cadre member. Other members of the committee include cadre members who are connected with the planned birth work of various sub-units of the commune. The committee is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of planned birth work in the commune. There are similar planned birth units at the brigade and team levels under the supervision of the commune committee.

The female cadre member at each level of a planned birth unit is responsible for day-to-day work on birth control. She is usually a married woman and is often the head or active member of the local branch of the Women's Federation and the Young Communist League. The "educational" and "thought" work (or persuasion work) is designed to change people's attitudes and motivation toward planned birth. A face-to-face approach is emphasized. Pressure for conformity to fertility goals is exerted through peer influence and through the vast network of small primary groups in which the whole population is organized, both in residential areas and places of work. Women and women's organizations are playing a significant and predominant role in the education for and discussion of planned birth goals and methods.²⁰

"Barefoot" doctors provide contraceptive knowledge and materials to the target population and make follow-up visits to patients under the guidance of the committee of planned birth work, with the assistance of team-level midwives and health aides. They also serve as intermediaries between the clinics or hospitals and those eligible for sterilization or those with unwanted pregnancies. In rural areas, female "barefoot" doctors may play an added, though unrecognized, role in motivating a target population to follow planned birth practices. They have won the confidence of their patients through their work in health practices, their close personal contacts, and their membership in the local community. The patients who form a target population for planned birth may be more susceptible and responsible to the advice of female "barefoot" doctors on the matter of birth control, even though "educational" and "thought" work is not a part of the daily task of the "barefoot" doctors. Often, a "barefoot" doctor has been selected by the community for training as a health prac-

titioner and as an "instructor" who is able to transmit family planning techniques to local villagers. These "barefoot doctors" then return to work in their own communities and are expected to make a long-term commitment to rural work. Thus the new family planning program in the 1970's allows a large degree of consumer participation and policy making in health matters (including planned birth).²¹

The latest known approach in local birth planning is "letting the masses draw up their birth plans and follow this through." First, the suggested targets are transmitted through the higher level planned birth committee. Then each small local group is urged to draw up its own birth plan. Local people assume the responsibility of lowering the childbirth rate, decide how to meet their targets, and exert peer pressure for compliance. Local people understand the local and personal factors that should be taken into consideration; they are responsible for the planning for local production, reinvestment, and social welfare and appreciate the relationship between child-rearing and its cost to the community. In practice, a ward committee or commune, for example, may suggest that the crude birth rate be lower than that of a previous year, say, for example, from 20 per thousand to 18 per thousand. This target is sent to the lower level units, although it is not binding at the lower levels. In a production team, residence group or factory, eligible couples will hold meetings to decide how to accomplish this goal. They estimate the number of childbirths that would yield a birth rate of 18 per thousand and then allocate the births among themselves. In deciding who should have a baby in the coming year, priorities in the following order are observed: (1) newlyweds, (2) couples with only one child (in cities) or two children (in the countryside), (3) couples with the longest interval between births. Couples who may have children in the coming year will refrain from practicing contraception; the others will practice contraception. Of course, adjustments must be made because of unplanned pregnancies, husbands away from home, and a couple's failure to conceive during the allotted period. The allocation of childbirths is established in the winter, and adjustments are made throughout the year. Abortions of unplanned pregnancies are not required, especially if couples have not yet completed their proper family size (two children in cities and three in the countryside), but the termination of such pregnancies can be encouraged through peer pressure. This system of birth planning was first introduced in Shanghai in the early 1970's and was reportedly spreading rapidly to other cities, but the extent of the spread in the countryside is not known.²²

In sum, the family planning program in the 1970's has the added features of rural thrust, decentralization and local control, the participation of the target population in planning and allocation, the increased involvement of women and women's organizations, and the

²⁰Pi-Chao Chen, "China's Population Program at the Grass-Roots Level," *Studies in Family Planning*, August, 1973, pp. 219-27.

²¹John N. Hawkins, *op. cit.*, p. 159-64.

²²Chen, *op. cit.*, August, 1975, p. 320.

emergence of the health worker-instructor role of bare-foot doctors in the target community.

Because family planning services are included in general health services, nearly all birth control methods are free. Conventional contraceptives, like condoms, diaphragms, foam tablets and suppositories, are provided at very low cost in urban pharmacies and in commune groceries cooperatives. Oral contraceptives are free; they are given to patients in lots of 22 pills, and a patient's supply is replenished each month by medical aides. Workers who have birth control operations are entitled to rest periods with full pay, e.g., three weeks for a tubal ligation, two weeks for an induced abortion, two days for an IUD insertion, and one day for a vasectomy. In order to facilitate the abortion operation in rural areas where electricity is not available and transportation is inadequate, a small stainless steel vacuum pump has been designed, which can be operated by foot pressure and is light in weight. A new form of IUD has also been devised, which is particularly suitable for women who work in the fields or factories. The IUD designed in the West was too frequently expelled inadvertently by working women; the new device is more appropriate for women workers.²³ Professor Carl Djerassi gained the impression during his trip to China that the output of oral contraceptives in 1972 might fill the needs of 20 million women per year; possibly one-third of Chinese women of reproductive age may be practicing birth control in one form or another.²⁴ Many visitors to China, including this author, came away with the impression that a relatively late age in marriage accompanied by strictly observed chastity before marriage are important factors in limiting fertility.

China has established a strong and pervasive family planning program in the 1970's. However, it is not possible to evaluate the effect of the program on the birth rate, because China will not release comprehensive statistics about vital trends and the planned birth program for a number of years. According to an eminent "China" scholar,²⁵ the Chinese do not actually know the actual size of their population or the precise rate at which it is growing. The statistics made available to the visitors to China are vital microstatistics for a number of cities and the suburban areas. Such statis-

tics indicate a recent decline in fertility, although no conclusions should be drawn for China as a whole. However, because of the pervasiveness of the present birth control program, even a limited acceptance by the rural population must have produced a significant decline in the birth rate.²⁶

Because the quality of family planning services is closely connected with the quality of the health services, any success in the decline of the birth rate must also be accompanied by a decline in the death rate. The quality of the Chinese health services, though improving, still needs a great deal of improvement. The death rate is expected to drop continuously, probably more slowly in the future years than it has in the past decade. There will be a rapid drop in the population growth rate only when the death rate begins to level off while the birth rate continues to decline. Prior to that time, the effect of family planning on lowering China's annual population growth rate will probably be moderate.

There are three sets of estimates of Chinese population. The set estimates of the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the United States Department of Commerce give a birth rate of 3.6-3.7 percent and a death rate of around 1.3 percent, yielding a natural growth rate of approximately 2.4 percent for recent years. The United Nation's medium variant estimates a birth rate of 2.5 percent and a death rate of 0.9 percent, yielding a growth rate of about 1.6 percent for 1975-1980. Professor Leo Orleans estimates a birth rate of 2.6-2.7 percent and a death rate of 1.2 percent, yielding a growth rate of 1.4-1.5 percent.²⁷ The last two estimates imply that China's birth rate and population growth rates have dropped significantly and are at a level midway between the population growth rates of industrialized nations and those of less developed nations.

If China's current population growth rate is actually as low as 1.5-1.6 percent, it is, of course, an achievement of no small degree. But in view of the fact that China wants to become a highly industrialized nation by the year 2000 and wants to become self-sufficient in food with a significant improvement in the diet and living standards of her citizens in the meantime, a population growth rate of 0.5 percent, like the rates achieved in some West European countries, is a necessity.²⁸ At her present stage of development, China seems to be able to feed her population with a growth rate of 1.5 percent-2.0 percent a year with no (or only minor) improvement in diet. Thus, China faces the formidable task of reducing population growth rate to 1.0 percent in a short span and, eventually, to 0.5 percent or lower. ■

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²³John Hawkins, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

²⁴Carl Djerassi, *op. cit.*, January/March, 1974, pp. 42, 51.

²⁵Leo A. Orleans, "China's Population Figures: Can the Contradictions Be Resolved?" *Studies in Family Planning*, February, 1976, pp. 56-57.

²⁶Ronald Freedman and Bernard Berelson, "The Record of Family Planning Programs," *Studies in Family Planning*, January, 1976, pp. 23-24; W. Parker Mauldin, "Fertility Trends: 1950-75," *Studies in Family Planning*, September, 1976, pp. 244-45.

²⁷Leo Orleans, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

²⁸For a discussion of the socioeconomic factors in future birth rate trends, see Kuan-I Chen, "Planned Population Growth in China," *Current History*, September, 1974, pp. 123-4.

"Although political education in Chinese schools has fallen somewhat short of the standards of intellectual rigor set by the authorities, it would be a mistake to underestimate its impact."

"Politics" in Chinese Higher Education

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SINCE the Communist accession to power in 1949, the feature that has distinguished Chinese national life and education from all other societies has been the predominance of what has been simply called politics. In China today, everything begins and ends with politics. And in the contemporary Chinese context, politics is an all-embracing term, with all shades of meaning and applying to all aspects of national life.

Anti-social or anti-socialist thought patterns and actions are invariably attributed to lack of political consciousness. Conversely, socialist morality is believed to reflect political rectitude. Even love and marriage are not immune from politics, for young men and women have been exhorted to subordinate their emotions and instincts to the loftier considerations of political compatibility. When expressing their views either in speaking or in writing, most Chinese seem to preface or conclude their remarks by inviting criticism for their "low level of political consciousness."

For higher education, the overriding importance of politics has been emphasized for obvious reasons. In the first place, Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his followers were aware of the fact that for many centuries China was a scholar-gentry-official-dominated society in which education based on the Confucian classics was the major criterion for admission to the ruling class. In more recent times, despite many innovations, higher education continued to serve primarily the interests of the ruling class and remained under the control of that class. This deep-rooted tradition could not be effectively overturned without changing the fundamental meaning of education in general and higher education in particular. Furthermore, since the socialist construction depends on the dedication of those who assume the leadership role as successors to the revolution, higher education must produce such leaders through proper ideological conditioning in what Mao believed to be a healthy political climate. Specifically, the stress on politics in higher education has meant the seizure of leadership from the pre-liberation bourgeois educators

who had enjoyed the prestige of being experts and authorities by virtue of their academic achievements and, later, from the so-called capitalist-roaders within the party. Instead, the stress on politics has led to the establishment of firm control by the proletariat, represented by the party and to the inculcation, by all means available, of the "correct" modes of thinking and socialist morality on the part of all who are exposed to higher education.

Under more or less normal conditions, in institutions of higher learning course work in politics takes up about 15 percent of the total course work, exclusive of productive labor. "Let politics take command," one of the cardinal principles of education, means that the study of politics (except for a very brief period in the mid-1950's) has consistently been stressed by both the party and the state, so much so that it is the most distinctive feature in Chinese education. The Communist leadership under Mao was convinced that the inculcation of a Communist world outlook depended on the proper teaching of political theories that were then further reinforced by revolutionary practice. Because the last years of secondary school education and the early years of higher education are the most crucial period in political indoctrination, special efforts are made during those years to insure success in the training of young socialists. The political aspect of the curriculum may be divided into three sections.

To begin with, there are the four courses in political theory: the foundation of Marxism-Leninism, the political economy, dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and the history of the Chinese Communist party (CCP). Since 1960, at the behest of the late Lin Biao, the "study Mao Tse-tung thought" movement swept across all campuses, and courses on "Readings in the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" were added to the curriculum. As for teaching materials, until the de-Stalinization campaign got under way in 1956, the *History of the Soviet Communist Party (Bolshevik)* of the Stalin era was adopted for the course in Foundations of Marxism-Leninism. Since 1956, no standard

text has been used. For the course in political economy, the text bearing that title, compiled by the Institute of Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, was in use until 1958, when it was replaced by a text of Chinese authorship. For dialectical materialism and historical materialism, the work by Joseph Stalin on that subject was used as the standard text for a number of years, but was later replaced by a text of the same title compiled by the CCP's Advanced Party School, under the chief editorship of Ai Ssu-ch'i. As for the history of the Chinese Communist party, Hu Ch'iao-mu's *Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party* formed the basic text until the early 1960's; more recently, some new lecture guides have been introduced on various campuses.

The second group of political courses revolve around current affairs and political tasks which, by virtue of the fast-changing nature of international and domestic affairs, have been highly susceptible to change. By and large, courses of this category have been conducted in the form of forums or colloquia, at which international affairs and domestic political developments are discussed, analyzed and explained. There are no fixed texts or references, and very often relevant material from publications like the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* are assigned reading. Nor are there regular class hours; the format most frequently adopted is the Saturday afternoon assembly, at which leading cadres from state and party organizations or the school's own party committee members lecture on specific topics or discuss and interpret important directives, policy statements or major speeches by national leaders. At times of urgent political tasks, such as the Socialist Education campaign of 1957 that came in the wake of the "Anti-rightist" movement, the "Study Anti-revisionist materials" campaign of 1963, and the "Anti-Lin Piao and Anti-Confucius" campaign of 1974, classes devoted to political theory have been suspended in favor of the study of current affairs and political tasks.

The third type of political education stresses the unity between theory and practice. In studying theory, the Communists emphasize the crucial importance of uniting theory with practice, history with the present, thought with action, and, especially, individual consciousness with political reality. In practice, this type of political education requires the students to grasp the essence of a specific theory and to expose those aspects of their own thought that are at variance with the theory in question, by means of self-criticism. After such individual thought problems are identified, the students are asked to study in-depth those parts of the Marxist-Leninist classics that can best help them to overcome their ideological deficiencies. At times, however, theories are put aside and specific, concrete issues are singled out for analysis, usually under the direction of instructors who are invariably leading cadres of either the party or the Young Communist League organiza-

tions. Conducted in the form of seminars or discussion sessions, this kind of political education is usually integrated into the political work of both the party and the league, and often undermines the intellectual aspect of ideological training.

No rules govern the distribution of time among the three parts of political education, the last of which—stressing relevance and unity—is more practice than theory but provides a link between the two. Broadly speaking, the study of Marxist-Leninist theory received greater attention before 1964, when more time was devoted to organized lectures and systematic reading. Since 1964, the year Mao asked the entire country to "learn from the People's Liberation Army," the Propaganda Department of the CCP has officially laid down the guideline that the three parts of political education, i.e., theory, current affairs, and practical application, should be given equal time in all schools.

TEACHER SHORTAGE

In spite of the emphasis on political education, there has been an acute shortage of qualified teaching personnel. Marxist intellectuals of the older generation, having distinguished themselves by taking part in the revolution, were with few exceptions given important posts in either the party or the state apparatus after 1949. Most of the political teachers are therefore of the younger generation, trained at the People's University or the CCP's Advanced Party School.

Relatively few of these younger teachers of politics have a firm grasp of the intellectual intricacies of Hegelian and Marxist philosophy; they are able to present the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, but few of them are competent in critical analysis and articulation. However, the high party authorities expect only an understanding of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism on the part of the students. Consequently, most students' comprehension of Communist theory seems to be superficial and fragmentary. Their reading seldom goes beyond excerpts from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Even the reading of Mao, which has been required of all students since the Cultural Revolution, usually remains at the level of the "quotations"; not many students have read the several volumes of Mao's *Selected Works*. The only exceptions are students who major in politics, law, philosophy or political economy; for them the whole body of Marxist literature is the core of their academic pursuit.

Most students exhibit dismally little interest in the political curriculum. Several factors are responsible for this. In the first place, because the training of specialists for the task of national construction was declared a major objective of education after 1949, and because the demands of academic subjects are heavy, students have found it imperative to devote their time and energy primarily to their chosen fields of specialization; therefore they tend to regard the study of politics as an extra

burden. Second, the frequency of political lectures and activities, which often duplicate what is taught in political courses, dampen the students' interest. Third, the level of teaching, in terms of substance and delivery, is often so low that most students regard the teaching of politics as a questionable academic exercise. Most students in fields unrelated to politics are aware that their future depends first and foremost on their mastery of the subjects in which they specialize and only incidentally on their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.

Thus students sometimes either doze or, not inconspicuously, complete other assignments in political classes, often under the eyes of party or league activists. Students regard politics as "soft" in contrast to academic subjects that are "hard." Since political courses rarely require homework or specific exercise, and since participation in class discussion demands no profundity, most students are understandably reluctant to exert themselves beyond a minimal effort.

Before the Cultural Revolution, students were examined from time to time to evaluate their political consciousness, their understanding of the theories of communism, and their ability to apply what they learned. In 1958, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council jointly announced that "when evaluating students' achievement, first importance must be assigned to their political consciousness which, in turn, should be assessed on the basis of their deeds and actions."¹ In the absence of specific and detailed instructions, teachers have found it difficult to evaluate students on the basis of this directive. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that most instructors of politics, who are under the supervision of the Teaching and Research Unit for Political Theories, rarely involve themselves in the work of student organizations and—since large classes prevent teachers from knowing students on an individual basis—have no way of judging the students in a meaningful manner. Even when the instructors collaborate with party and league activists who operate among the students, the lack of objective and commonly acceptable standards renders evaluation difficult. As a result, in most schools, the political aspect of student performance was usually assessed according to examination results, although the Propaganda Department of the CCP reaffirmed in 1964 the importance of evaluating students on the basis of their political attitudes and actions. Since the Cultural Revolution, examinations have been abolished, resulting in a further erosion of the academic aspects of political education.

Although political education in Chinese schools has fallen somewhat short of the standards of intellectual rigor set by the authorities, it would be a mistake to underestimate its impact. Under communism, no modes of thought other than the state-approved ideology can find expression or can be disseminated in China. The

exclusive and monolithic nature of official ideology, coupled with the constant and unrelenting demand for further study and participation in political movements of one kind or another, have conditioned the students to internalize the Marxist world view. Although most students have not developed a firm belief in the philosophy of communism, through long periods of exposure they nevertheless have acquired the habit of looking at all problems and issues from the Marxist point of view. Most students thus accept the universality of the law of unity of opposites, believe in the class character of man and the idea that all revolutions originate from class struggle, and subscribe to the Marxist theory of surplus value, which explains the exploitative nature of capitalism whose decay and ultimate downfall are regarded as inevitable. Thus the dictum in the Communist Manifesto that "the ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class" seems to agree with the Chinese reality.

NEW ORGANIZATION

With respect to methods, over the past 27 or so years there have been organizational and operational changes. Immediately after the Communist takeover, the task of political education in institutions of higher education was entrusted to what was known at that time as the office of political guidance (*Cheng-chih fu-tao ch'u*), which formed an integral part of the administration of a college or university. Each university office was staffed by representatives of the People's Liberation Army and, in some cases, by party members who had infiltrated into the institutions as underground activists before liberation. In some ways, the university's office of political guidance was comparable to the dean of student affairs in other countries, with a position organizationally on a par with the office of academic affairs. With the completion of higher education reorganization toward the end of 1953, however, these offices of political guidance were replaced by the Communist party committees that had been established in all colleges and universities. Over the years, the party committees steadily expanded their scope of functions and in the process gained so much authority that they became the centers of power on the campuses.

By the late 1950's, with the removal of non-party professional educators from administrative positions, the secretary of the party committee became, for all intents and purposes, the real chief administrator of the educational institution to which he was assigned. The organization of the party committees in a college or university follows the pattern of central and local party organizations, with a secretary at the top, two or more deputy secretaries, and a number of departments with sub-divisions. Receiving directives from above and implementing party policies on the campuses, the party committees represent the Chinese Communist party and coordinate the work of political organizations like

¹*People's Daily*, September 20, 1958.

the Young Communist League, the Union of Educational Workers and the Students Association, all of which are expected to take part in the task of providing political education. Moreover, there are branch party committees within each faculty, academic department, or other sub-units of the college or university.

Under the overall direction and supervision of the central party leadership, the party committee is responsible for the organization and mobilization of teachers and students for all major political movements, like the Rectification and Anti-rightist campaign, of 1957, the Four-Clearance Movement of 1964, the Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius Movement of 1974. Once a major movement is launched, the party committee in a given school responds to directives from above and issues instructions to all party and league members, to gather relevant information and data and to make decisions on the implementation of policy decisions handed down by the party's top leadership. The degree of involvement and the scope of mobilization vary. In the case of the Anti-Rightist campaign of the mid-1950's, for example, the party committees of colleges and universities mobilized almost the entire faculty and student body to investigate the political and personal background and conduct of those teachers and students who had been selected as "targets" for public struggle and to carry out, step by step, the party's tactical plans for the achievement of specific political and psychological objectives. For movements not directly aimed at members of the intelligentsia, like the often repeated increase production campaigns, the party committees also assumed the leadership role on campuses to publicize the goals of the campaigns and to organize students to achieve these goals.

Before the Cultural Revolution, the party committee, led by its secretary, determined all policies regarding political and ideological education on the campus. Regular meetings discussed the contents and ramifications of directives, to assess the political attitudes and views of the faculty and students, to decide the programs of political education and priorities, and to exchange views on specific issues. By and large, the party committees of higher educational institutions, following the principle of "democratic centralism," merely served as arms of the party hierarchy, carrying out the policy decisions of higher units like the ministry of education of the State Council or the Propaganda Department of the CCP's Central Committee. It has been exceedingly rare for a party committee in a college or university to go against the wishes of the higher authorities or to recommend a course of action not in conformity with their instructions.

The overriding importance of politics in Chinese education is reflected not only in the amount of time and energy devoted to ideological indoctrination but also in the very great concern of party leaders with all aspects of student life on and off campus. In respect to

the formal aspect of political education, the Propaganda Department of the party committee is in charge of tasks like curricular formulation, class scheduling, preparation and distribution of teaching materials and reference works, evaluation of the effectiveness of instructors, and assessment of the political consciousness of students. As for the organization and mobilization of students, the coordination of various types of student activities and the preliminary screening of students for either League or party membership, the Young Communist League, which is ancillary to the party organization, has been given the major responsibility. Like the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party on the national level, the party committees in higher educational institutions also have a department of united front to win over the older intellectuals who enjoy the respect of students because of their scholarship and academic accomplishments. Cadres representing the united front department "consult" or "seek suggestions" from older professors of national renown, assist them in their ideological "self improvement," and instruct them on how to conduct themselves in times of political campaigns. To those who have been singled out for "struggle," these same cadres are known to have been arrogant and harsh.

Since departments form the basic administrative units in colleges and universities, each department also has a branch committee of the Communist party, which functions on the lower level according to instruction from the party committee. On the grassroots level, there are party cells among student party members who, as a rule, are admitted into the party on the strength of their class background, dedication to the ideals of communism and unquestioned loyalty to the party's top leadership.

Because of the emphasis on politics and ideological correctness, the Communist party organizations in higher institutions of learning have almost unlimited power to regulate the lives of teachers and students, formulating all policies, including academic policies, and deciding the future of untold numbers of young men and women.

THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

The Communist party committees in institutions of higher education are augmented and supported by organizations like the Young Communist League (until September, 1956, known as the New Democratic Youth League), the Union of Educational Workers, and the Student Association. The Young Communist League, as its constitution states, is "led by the Communist party of China and is also the assistant and reserve force of the party." Approximately four million of its 25 million members between the ages of 15 and 25 (in the mid-1960's) are in school, and many members are attending colleges and universities.

Because of its considerably larger membership among

students (when compared with membership in the Communist party itself), the YCL, as a youth and mass organization, has assumed the key role of politicizing both its member and non-member students. In a given college or university, the YCL organization parallels the organization of the party committee, with secretaries and departments and branch League organizations on the department level. Taking orders from the party committee, the League seeks to promote correct political thinking among students and sponsors extra-curricular activities, including group tours of old revolutionary bases, visits of specially arranged exhibitions, interviews with Communist leaders and, until the early 1960's, summer camps and recreational programs. As the party's reserve force, the League admits students with sufficient political consciousness and willingness to work for the cause of the party, and membership in the League is, in most cases, a prerequisite for eventual admission into the party itself.

Before the Cultural Revolution, all educational institutions had a branch of the Union of Educational Workers whose membership included all regular full-time teaching and administrative staff. The union, under the sponsorship and supervision of the Communist party, performed useful functions in the early 1950's, convincing the teaching personnel of the older generation of the need to support the new regime and to contribute their knowledge and skill to the building of a new Chinese society. Some professors of established reputation not only took part in the work of the union but also assumed such administrative positions as head of a branch or chief of a section. With the consolidation of party power, however, the political aspect of the union's activities steadily diminished and, by the late 1950's, in higher educational institutions this organization had become no more than a welfare agency, providing financial assistance to members in times of extreme personal difficulty. Although the union called itself a "school for teaching Marxism-Leninism and a link between the party and the masses," it did not play a significant role in political education; in fact, it ceased to function after the Cultural Revolution.

The same is true of the Student Association, which has branches in all colleges and universities and to which all students automatically belong. During the Civil War period in the late 1940's, higher institutions of education in Nationalist-controlled areas had student organizations of one sort or another and many of them were infiltrated by underground Communist activists, who were supported by their sympathizers among the students. After Liberation, the student associations on various campuses were placed under party and League control and were politically active to further the party's cause. Once the party's power was firmly established, the student associations gradually faded and became no more than appendages to the Young Communist League, performing some non-political functions, spons-

soring of sports events and recreational activities among the students.

Mention should also be made of the several political parties that the Communist party allowed to continue to exist after 1949. In institutions of higher education, however, these political parties, of which the China Democratic League and the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee were more active, were allowed to operate among and recruit members from faculty members with a lecturer's rank or higher, but were not allowed to operate among the younger teachers and students. After 1957, even the very limited activities of such so-called democratic parties ceased to function.

Chinese leaders have clearly regarded the inculcation of correct political thinking as the single most important task in higher education and have, over the years, established a party-dominated institutional framework for that purpose. Within that framework, the personnel arrangement is indicative of the scope and nature of political education but also its areas of tension.

The personnel responsible for the content and the form of political education in institutions of higher learning may be divided into two major categories: full-time and part-time cadres. In the full-time category are the secretaries and deputy secretaries, members and administrative staff of the Communist party committee and the Young Communist League, as well as all those who work full time for the party committee and YCL sub-units on the department and class level. In the party hierarchy, party committee and League secretaries and some deputy secretaries are classified as "high-ranking cadres," who usually have the administrative rating of 12 or above, while those occupying lower positions belong to the "middle-ranking" or "low-ranking" cadres. Whether high or low, party and League functionaries are, without exception, members of the CCP. The part-time category includes those party card-carrying members of the faculty and selected students who, because of their political reliability, are given part-time assignments in either the party or League organizations, usually in the capacity of secretary of branch party committees or branch League committees. Occasionally, a few outstanding part-time cadres are elected into the general committee of either the party or the League; others are given assignments as political advisers to a class or a department. Since the part-time cadres have their regular duties to perform (teaching, research or administration), their political activities become intensive only when a major movement is launched.

Although all political cadres form an organization-

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON CHINA

COMRADE CHIANG CH'ING. *By Roxane Witke.* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 549 pages, illustrations, maps and index, \$15.00.)

In 1972, Roxane Witke had a week-long series of interviews with Chiang Ch'ing, the fourth and last wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and one of the political powers in China. After Mao's death in 1976, Chiang and three followers were arrested by China's present leaders; among other charges leveled against Chiang Ch'ing was the charge that she had used these interviews with Witke to help "establish a cult of herself" and undoubtedly had betrayed party and personal secrets to a foreigner. Witke sees this book as Chiang's "bid for historical recognition . . . her attempt to record her past as she alone knows it, and to be remembered in the future for her beliefs and accomplishments."

At the time of Mao's death, the life of one of the world's most powerful women "was lonely and harsh, devoid of trust and tenderness save for a few familial and comradely attachments. . . . Ever present in her consciousness was uncertainty of Mao's support of her grandiose projects . . . the anxiety . . . runs like a red thread through her narrative." After all, Mao had already run through three wives and done away with two designated successors, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Pao. Chiang felt that only the revolutionary masses could offer her political legitimacy and security; this belief led to her leadership of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's.

Originally Witke had been promised transcripts of all the interviews, but she only received the first. Thus this book is written from her own notes and memories although she received books and photographs, some by Chiang Ch'ing, after her return to this country. The book, therefore, is an amalgam of Chiang's narration and Witke's observations and judgments.

This story of the life of Chiang Ch'ing, her impoverished childhood, her indoctrination and adoption of the Communist party beliefs, her life as an actress, her ordeals shared with the Communist cadres during the Japanese invasion and the Nationalist regime and, finally, her precarious hold on power before Mao's death, are almost the subject for a fairy tale. Witke's study is an excellent example of historical writing, a skillful blend of historical fact with excerpts from her series of interviews.

All her life Chiang was an avid revolutionary both in the service of the Communist party and in the

struggle for an equal status for women. She was the real leader of the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's, when personal and party enemies were punished because they had not supported Chairman Mao Tse-tung and when a Mao-centered ideology was developed.

Mao died on September 9, 1976; a week later, on September 16, Chiang Ch'ing and three other close disciples of Mao were arrested as counterrevolutionaries by the apparent new ruler of China, Hua Kuo-feng.

It is interesting and alarming from an American viewpoint to see how the principle of the Communist ethic guided Chiang's life. To read her own words in these interviews is to see a world not like ours but one with which we must learn to deal.

The complete index, the photographs and maps, the chronology of Chiang's life and the documentary sources make this a valuable book for the scholar and a readable biography of an interesting and dangerous woman.

O.E.S.

CHINA POLICY. *By A. Doak Barnett.* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. 131 pages and index, \$8.95, cloth; \$2.95, paper.)

China expert Doak Barnett reviews United States-China relations in the 1970's, the complications caused by the death of Mao, and what he considers the requirements for improving United States relations with China in the future.

The opening of diplomatic relations with China in 1972 ended 20 years of hostility and confrontation; but the "ties between Washington and Peking are still limited . . . and it remains to be seen whether the normalizing process can even be carried through to establishment of full diplomatic relations." China, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States have an opportunity to "create a new and more stable equilibrium in East Asia; [but] they could pursue policies" that would work in the opposite direction. Since the 1950's, China and the United States have regarded each other as a threat to basic security, but with the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's, both the United States and China saw more reason to be on less hostile terms with each other. In addition, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon hoped to "achieve greater leverage" in their dealings with the Soviets by a greater flexibility toward China. In February, 1972, President Nixon met with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai in Peking and opened a new era of

United States-China relations, temporarily setting aside the problem presented by Taiwan.

Since that time, Chinese-American relations have been in a "holding pattern," partly because of Mao's illness and death. Barnett believes that China's new leaders may be prepared to take a harder line on Taiwan and to ease their stand against the Soviet Union, perhaps as a means of encouraging new United States diplomatic overtures. But American public opinion may make it difficult for President Jimmy Carter to make too many compromises with regard to Taiwan.

Barnett recommends basing United States policy toward China "on a realistic definition of American interests and priorities in relation to China and the East Asian region as a whole." We should recognize that further improvement in "Sino-American relations will not be easy" and will "depend on the priority both Washington and Peking give to the necessity for compromise and mutual accommodation."

"In its attempts to consolidate and expand relations with China, the United States will have to make some difficult decisions. . . . Step-by-step progress in solving particular problems should result in steady improvement in the overall relationship."

Barnett has written an excellent handbook on current and future United States-China policy. O.E.S.

SOVIET AND CHINESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: THE WESTERN VIEW. By Louis J. Samelson. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1976. 64 pages and references, \$3.00, paper.)

In this study, Louis J. Samelson offers a systematic analysis of Soviet and Chinese diplomatic negotiating techniques and compares those techniques with the apparently more traditional methods of the United States and other more conventional countries.

According to Samelson, the Soviet Union regards diplomacy as a "form of Soviet political warfare," while the Chinese practice an "adversary diplomacy" with an intent to "upset and not accommodate" the other party. He admits that some foreign policy experts believe that these unusual approaches are most pronounced when the Soviets and the Chinese are not really "interested in a settlement" and that they may use more conventional diplomatic methods when a real need for accommodation is perceived.

After citing numerous instances of Soviet and Chinese diplomatic behavior, Samelson concludes that the Chinese and Soviets "have indeed adopted fairly comparable obstructionist negotiating techniques for dealing with the West, techniques which most analysts agree reflect "a specific disregard, if not a deliberate rejection, of many of the fundamental methods of traditional Western diplomacy." O.E.S.

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. By Harold C. Hinton. (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1977. 72 pages, \$4.95, cloth; \$2.95 paper.)

Harold Hinton analyzes the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute that erupted in the 1960's, even to the extent of dangerous border confrontations in 1969 in which military clashes occurred. He assesses the probable motives of Soviet and Chinese leaders and how these motives affected their relations with the United States. He believes that United States-Soviet détente is the outcome of warmer American-Chinese diplomatic relations.

Hinton produces all sorts of interesting predictions about the future relationships between the two countries, including wars of various degrees of seriousness or a possible reconciliation. He discusses, at length, the implications for the United States of these various possibilities and proposes some possible United States policy initiatives. This is a short study crammed full of facts and interesting theories well worth the consideration of the scholar. O.E.S.

CHINA'S FOREIGN AID. By John Franklin Copper. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company—Lexington Books, 1976. 197 pages, appendices, bibliographic notes, and index, \$17.50.)

Since 1953, China has maintained a generally modest but not unimportant foreign aid program in the third world. This useful reference work examines the origins of China's foreign assistance program, the kinds of aid and technical assistance that have been given to different areas of the third world, and the distinctive features of China's effort.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

SUN YAT-SEN: FRUSTRATED PATRIOT. By C. Martin Wilbur. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 410 pages, bibliography, notes and index, \$16.50.)

C. Martin Wilbur traces the major influences in the life of the founder of the People's Republic of China. Wilbur believes that Sun Yat-Sen died a disappointed man because, "lured on by his dreams and seeing himself as the instrument for their fulfillment, he was repeatedly thwarted by intractable realities within China and the outer world." O.E.S.

LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE. By Victor H. Li, editor. (467 pages, appendices and index, \$20.00.)

The contributors to this volume describe the trade patterns and regulations of the People's Republic of China in dealing with the industrialized nations of the world. The appendices contain copies of trade agreements useful for the scholar. O.E.S.

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CHINA AFTER MAO

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of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and Deputy Vice Chairman of the party. The Central Committee also announced its "unanimous approval" of the actions taken by the Politburo, under Hua's leadership, to smash the Gang of Four—"a counterrevolutionary conspiratorial clique." And then, the Central Committee announced approval of a Politburo decision to convene the Eleventh CCP Congress. Included on the Congress's projected agenda are, naturally, the revision of the party constitution and the election of a new Central Committee.¹⁵

The convening of that party gathering will constitute final proof that the consolidation process has reached its term, that the pragmatic policies of Hua Kuo-feng and Chou En-lai have been legitimized, and that the new "great order" foreseen by Hua has been established in China. A meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fourth National People's Congress would cap the whole. And the new policy lines will be religiously crowned, at several stages, with the ultimate sanction conveyed by appropriate citations from the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung."

In sum, where Eurocommunism was established on a more diverse and pragmatic theoretical base in June, 1976, a less "revolutionary" Sinocommunism is now in the process of formulation. And the present prospect is that the People's Republic of China, operating on the basis of a reinterpreted and revised Maoist communism, will by the year 2000 have come close to achieving its goal: to be "a powerful modern socialist state" in political, economic and military terms. ■

¹⁵The New York Times, July 23, 1977.

THE CHINESE ECONOMY AFTER THE "GANG OF FOUR"

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after the Cultural Revolution. There are signs that the revolution in education is being gradually rolled back and that the teachers' battered prestige is being painfully rebuilt. The gang, of course, is blamed for the educational morass—for once accurately. "Their abominable purpose was to make a mess of the schools."²⁴ They succeeded. China's most important single need in a longer-range perspective is to train large numbers of people able to handle the sophisticated technology implied in the four modernizations, and to originate

²⁴Yuan Ting, "Encourage Respect for Teachers and Love for Students," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), March 27, 1977, in *SPRC*, no. 6318, April 13, 1977, p. 47.

such technology. A greater regard for "book knowledge" must come back to the schools.

NATURAL DISASTERS

In 1976, a series of natural calamities shook China. The earthquakes that rocked Lungling in May and Tangshan in July caused heavy damage to a segment of China's coal industry. It is believed that more than 650,000 died in Tangshan alone, and that the destruction extended to hundreds of factories and mines in eastern Hopei province. Much farmland within a radius of several miles of the epicenter was covered with sand and damaged by gushing water. The Kailan coal mine, which employs some 100,000 people, was heavily damaged. Before the disaster, the mine reportedly supplied 40 percent of the coking coal used by China's steel industry. By all accounts, the reaction of the stricken population was orderly, calm and courageous. Reconstruction work is proceeding.

The massive campaign directed against the four pests has added a little spice to mainland Chinese journalism. It is remarkable that the once powerful radical faction was contained, smitten and silenced in one quick and bold move. The battle is not yet won, but without their leaders, the radicals will find it very difficult to stage an early comeback. Assuming a continuation of the present leadership, the economy will gradually move in the direction of the four modernizations along a road resembling orthodox neo-Stalinist socialism, implemented by plans, rules, regulations, labor discipline, hierarchies, material incentives, and a large bureaucracy. ■

"POLITICS" IN CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION

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ally distinct group within a given institution of higher education, there are clearly recognizable circles among them. The high-ranking secretaries and deputy secretaries of the party committees form the innermost circle, surrounded by the middle-ranking full-time cadres who form the second circle, which in turn is surrounded by the low-ranking part-time cadres who make up the third circle; finally, there are the ordinary party and League members in the student body who make up the outer circle. The political cadres' attitude toward and treatment of the so-called masses tend to vary. (In the case of schools, the term "masses" refers to all individuals who are not members of either the party or the League, but party cadres with responsible positions often regard ordinary card-carrying party and League members as "masses" as well.) Attitudes depend on the individual cadre's temperament, education and personality traits. While the party central committee has always exhorted all cadres to "go into the masses," to be selfless in working for the masses, and to set good examples, some cadres have behaved toward the masses in an arrogant manner, drunk with their sense of power and self-

importance. The political climate also affects the attitude and behavior of the cadres. At times of great economic difficulty, as in the late 1950's, most students suffered from malnutrition and other forms of distress, and the campuses held an atmosphere of gloom and disaffection. Faced with the gloomy masses, the cadres adopted a policy of "reasonableness and compassion."

Most important, however, is the effect of party policy decisions with respect to intellectuals. When the party central committee called for unity and treated the intellectuals as allies or as potential allies, the political cadres' behavior toward teachers and students tended to be moderate and even friendly. During times of struggle, however, the cadres usually proved to be severe and unapproachable, often resorting to abusive language or even to physical violence in dealing with what they regarded as "targets of struggle."

In both institutional and personnel terms, the Cultural Revolution brought profound change to all institutions of higher education. Although the tempest of the Cultural Revolution hit individual teachers and students identified with the so-called rightists and capitalist-roaders, party cadres in charge of political education on campuses were also singled out as "targets" for the first time while the institutional framework within which these cadres had operated was irreparably shattered. Many party committee secretaries were removed from their positions of power and authority and subjected to severe criticism and personal attack. Those in the lower ranks likewise became targets of the masses' wrath, and the entry on the campuses of Workers' Mao Tse-tung Thought Propaganda Teams created an entirely new and fluid situation in which older organizations, social and personal relations, and operational procedures ceased to function. When the revolutionary dust began to settle in the early 1970's, many party and League cadres had lost their earlier positions, a loss that gave rise to a sense of disillusionment on the part of the erstwhile power-holders and a feeling of uncertainty on the part of most students.

THE DOWNFALL OF THE "GANG"

Inasmuch as political leadership in colleges and universities was seized by the more radical elements in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the recent downfall of the "Gang of Four" signaled the beginning of a new phase in Chinese higher education. While the new leadership under Hua Kuo-feng has refrained from openly challenging the Maoist dictum that politics is the soul of education, straws in the wind suggest a gradual return to pre-Cultural Revolution beliefs and practices. On November 19, 1976, the *People's Daily* quoted Mao as having said in April, 1975:

Not many people in our party really know Marxism-Leninism. Some who think they know it in fact do not know very much. They consider themselves always in the right and are ready at all times to lecture others. This in itself is a manifestation of a lack of knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.

If a quarter of a century's intensive efforts at political education has yielded such deplorable results, those who are aware of the serious consequences of disrupting higher education in the name of politics must wonder what role politics will play in Chinese higher education in the immediate future. ■

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

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nation still recognizing Taiwan). A dramatic dilemma for China's leaders concerns Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Castro, as widely admired in many third world circles as China's late Chairman Mao Tse-tung, has been transformed by China's ideologists from a gallant foe of American "imperialism" into a "running dog" of Soviet "social imperialism."

THE UNITED NATIONS

Many of these dilemmas are aired in the United Nations, which since China's entrance in 1971 has been a major platform for third world causes. Modestly disclaiming third world leadership in favor of mere membership, China routinely blames the superpowers (especially the Soviet Union) when intra-third world conflict arises (e.g., Cyprus). If necessary, China simply abstains—as she did last fall when Angola applied for U.N. membership. China's outrage over Soviet-Cuban handiwork in Angola was moderated by what China knew would be Africa's outrage had China blocked Angola's admission.

Overall, China's leaders have given unstinting support to the independence and autonomy of third world states in the United Nations, suggesting strongly that China sees self-reliance as the sine qua non of independence. Peking has consistently held to this posture at various U.N.-sponsored conferences involving population, pollution and ocean resources. Such support for independence/autonomy seems to stand Marxist universalism on its head, but China is willing to pay this price if only because, through their own history, her leaders understand the power of nationalism. Though China holds a veto as a permanent Security Council member, she has even supported a U.N. restructuring to give the third world a larger and more effective voice.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

China has linked the self-reliance theme to her opposition to arms control and disarmament. Chinese leaders have not signed the 1963 partial nuclear test-ban treaty, and China continues atmospheric testing, a fact that pleases few third world nations. Nor has Peking signed the 1968 non-proliferation treaty. This too concerns some third world leaders, although in this in-

stance China can be regarded as a signatory in view of the fact that she has not transferred nuclear weapons abroad. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are caustically dismissed as a "plot by the superpowers to gain worldwide hegemony," but here again most third world nations probably wish only success for the SALT negotiators. In contrast, playing the other side of the street, China recently publicized her signature on a protocol in support of the Latin American nuclear free zone—pointedly noting at the same time that Moscow is not a signer.¹⁵ Overall, however, "far from recommending immediate disarmament," China has "recommended building up" defenses until the superpowers disarm.¹⁶

CONCLUSION

A decade ago, China's foreign policy was in shambles. Now, despite assorted problems, the People's Republic has won a place for itself. China now engages in diplomatic relations with 114 nations, while Taiwan's formal diplomatic ties have dwindled to 23. China now sits in the U.N. In brief, after a century-long quest, China has joined that increasingly amorphous body known as the community of nations.

These achievements predated the death of Mao Tse-tung, and his successors—Hua Kuo-feng and his colleagues—have been so occupied in a struggle for power and legitimacy against the "Gang of Four" that they have focused upon domestic issues. Foreign policy has thus been relegated to a holding pattern, and while new trends are barely discernible, there appears to be a slightly more open posture toward the industrialized West. There are few signs of changes toward the third world, and in the most essential area, the anti-Soviet posture continues unabated.

Finally, whatever the elements of power and however adroitly they may be maneuvered, there is no reason to assume that China's present policies will follow any straight-line projection into the future. On the contrary, change—perhaps very crucial change—should be expected.

Outside observers, particularly Westerners (and, most particularly, Americans), feel rather comfortable with China these days, in part because they view current Chinese policies as more or less "rational" (their highest compliment). The Western public understands vaguely that Peking is "anti-Soviet" and that, of course, is "good." The same public knows vaguely that China kicks up a lot of dust about third world problems, and that is not unacceptable either, because in a Bicentennial euphoria Americans have a rough sympathy concerning the obvious injustices in the third world, even if the subject bores us a bit.

Yet China is not pleased with the status quo; witness the Chinese attitude:

The present international situation is still characterized by great disorder under heaven, a disorder which is growing greater and greater. . . . Countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution—this has become an irresistible historical current. . . . The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are the biggest international oppressors and exploiters today, and they are the source of a new world war. . . . The people of all countries must get prepared.

Is this the voice of some shrill Red Guard or an associate of that "radical" element led by the now-deposed widow of Mao Tse-tung? These are, in fact, the words of that preeminent "rationalist," Premier Chou En-lai, delivered as part of his last state-of-the-union address a year before his death in 1976.¹⁷ ■

CHINA'S GREAT WALL

(Continued from page 62)

Meanwhile, strides made in rocket technology are gradually being applied to enhance China's strategic intelligence-gathering capabilities. The low orbits of three earth satellites launched in the last half of 1975 indicated to analysts in the United States that Peking is developing a spy satellite.¹⁵ At present, only the United States and Soviet Union have such intelligence-gathering systems.

Whether China will develop other nuclear weapons remains to be seen. Even after the deterrent missile force is complete, the absence of tactical nuclear weapons to support the ground forces will remain a serious weakness. It is probable that research and development efforts are now being devoted to tactical weapons and to ballistic missiles, but the PLA has yet to test a tactical warhead. The most likely initial form for such weapons would be small bombs that could be carried by F-9 aircraft, with the later development of nuclear warheads for conventional artillery.

The current tri-level military organization of main and regional forces supported by militia is structured for defensive and protracted warfare. It would concede territory to technologically superior invaders in order to bog down the aggressor. There are two weaknesses in that concept. First, as Chinese industrialization expands, it becomes increasingly costly to allow major cities and lines of communication to fall into enemy hands. There is increasing pressure for a forward defense that would stop the enemy at the borders or fight him in a third country. Second, China's force structure is best prepared against a conventional invasion—a strategy that few, if any, of Peking's potential enemies would be apt to adopt. Instead of attacking the greatest

¹⁵*Ibid.*, no. 19, May 6, 1977, p. 47.

¹⁶"Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly*, no. 69, March, 1977, p. 213.

¹⁷*Peking Review*, no. 4, January 24, 1975, p. 24.

¹⁵*Newsweek*, March 1, 1976, p. 65.

strength of the PLA, an enemy could be expected to challenge the technologically deficient air and naval forces, which are so weak that a highly modern force could harass and intimidate China from the air and sea with either conventional or nuclear weapons. Of course, it would be extremely unwise for an enemy to resort to nuclear weapons unless the attacker's homeland and allies lay outside the striking distance of Peking's limited-range ICBM force.

During most of the 1970's, the PLA has had to depend on the protracted war defense strategy. The military budget from 1972 to 1976 was reduced, and ambitious modernization schemes had to be shelved. However, in the new leadership under Chairman Hua Kuo-feng the military has made a political comeback. Hua might not have been able to consolidate his power without PLA support, and the number two man in the hierarchy is now Yeh Chien-ying—the Defense Minister and a longtime proponent of military modernization in China.

The PLA is apparently attempting to collect its political debts by means of a more favorable allocation of resources. A debate on military strategy and force building has been under way through the first half of 1977. Provincial military broadcasts have linked the protracted war strategy to the dismissed and disgraced radicals, led by Madam Mao Tse-tung, indicating that at least some top military leaders believe they can now openly advocate a forward defense concept.¹⁶ In February, 1977, military meetings in Peking apparently resulted in a decision to speed up the modernization of all branches of the PLA.¹⁷ However, the leadership is not about to let the defense budget spiral out of sight. In July, the *Liberation Army Daily* stated that high priority will be given to accelerating national defense production "on the basis of doing a good job in national economic construction."¹⁸ In other words, defense allocations will not be so great as to imbalance industrial development. Defense spending already represents a comparatively large portion of the national budget.

If China does finally decide to pursue PLA modernization aggressively, it will indicate that Chinese leaders have no intention of trying to compromise their way to détente with the U.S.S.R. Extensive modernization would not be required to deal with Taiwan or any other country on China's borders. China's old enemies—the United States, Japan and India—are each making their peace on China's terms. There will be conflicts of national interest with Vietnam over offshore oil claims and Southeast Asian politics, but no one realistically expects such difficulties to lead to war. This proposed upgrading of PLA capabilities can only mean that China is preparing for a prolonged period of continued hostility with the Soviet Union. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 85)

DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE SOCIETY. By Amy A. Wilson, Sidney L. Greenblatt and Richard W. Wilson, editors. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. 227 pages, notes, glossary and index, \$5.95, paper.)

The editors have chosen a wide-ranging selection of articles to give a broad view of Chinese society in modern China; they examine the social and psychological restraints on behavior and opinion and on political factors that also affect the society. O.E.S.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN MODERN TIMES: ON PROFESSIONALS, PRAETORIANS AND REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS. By Amos Perlmutter. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 335 pages, notes and index, \$15.00.)

In analyzing the role of the military in modern states, Perlmutter explores the role of the revolutionary soldier in Communist China and how this type of soldier helped shape Chinese politics. He offers interesting comparisons between the Chinese military and the military in some 50 other nations.

O.E.S.

CONTEMPORARY CHINA. By Bill Brugger. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1977. 451 pages, biographical data, bibliography and index, \$22.50.)

Australian scholar Bill Brugger has written a "chronological account of events in China from the 1940's," well-annotated and as interesting to read as the mass of material allows. ■

ERRATA: The editors regret two typographical errors and several alterations in meaning in the article "Controlling Inflation in Canada," by M. L. Kliman, in our April, 1977, issue.

On page 166, beginning with the last line in the left hand column, the last two sentences should be replaced by the following sentence: "Though the inflation rate dropped substantially in 1976, and there is reason to be concerned about excess economic capacity and insufficient aggregate demand, the inflation question continues to share center stage."

On page 167, the sentence beginning on line 8 should read: "On average, weekly earnings in industries covered by these industries remained constant in 1973 and rose insignificantly in 1974."

On page 167, the sentence beginning on line 34 should read: "At that time, the government was criticized because it adopted a tough monetary-fiscal stance that reduced the rate of inflation and generated substantially increased unemployment."

On page 169, the last 3 sentences of the last paragraph should read: "An equally important question will be the emergence of an accepted view in government circles as to the desirability of ever applying a similar policy again. Regardless of the impossibility of scientifically evaluating the effectiveness of the controls in an authoritative manner, the debate will take place and a conventional view that the controls worked is as likely a result as its opposite. If the positive view dominates, future governments will find it difficult to resist pressures for reintroducing controls. Familiarity can breed credence as well as contempt."

¹⁶ *Washington Post*, April 16, 1977, p. A-15.

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, April 6, 1977, p. A-11.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of July, 1977, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

East-West Conference on Troop Reductions

July 21—Meeting in Vienna, the 19-nation East-West conference on troop reductions adjourns for the summer; Warsaw Pact nations and NATO countries still face major disagreements.

European Economic Community (EEC)

July 6—Members of the European Economic Community (Common Market) Parliament meet in Luxembourg.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

July 14—World Bank president Robert McNamara notifies the U.S. that the bank will not accept future U.S. aid if Congress prohibits the use of U.S. funds for loans to Vietnam and 6 other countries.

Middle East

July 20—In Washington, D.C., after his discussions with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin outlines his proposals for peace in the Middle East. He calls for a resumption of the Geneva conference based on the 1973 representation—not to include the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

PLO spokesman Mahmoud Labadi calls Begin's peace proposal "... not a peace plan but a war plan. ..."

Non-Communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations

July 8—The foreign ministers of the 4 members of the non-Communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations close 4 days of meetings in Singapore with an agreement to work for better relations with the Communist countries of Indochina.

Organization of African Unity

July 2—Leaders of 48 African nations meet in Libreville, Gabon, in the annual assembly of the Organization of African Unity. Benin did not send representatives. The chairman for next year will be Gabon's President Albert-Bernard Bongo.

July 5—The OAU ends its meetings in Libreville, Gabon, with an endorsement of the Rhodesian nationalist movement, the Patriotic Front, headed by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

July 3—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates announce a 5 percent price increase for their oil, effective July 1; this ends the oil price differential of the last 6 months among the OPEC members.

July 12—Iran and Saudi Arabia call for an oil price freeze for 1978 because of their doubts about the stability of Western industrial economies.

United Nations

July 1—The United States delegation to the United Na-

tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) pays \$43,115,039 in back dues to the organization; the U.S. stopped paying dues in 1974 after UNESCO adopted Arab-sponsored anti-Israeli resolutions.

July 15—The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference closes in New York. Delegates from 145 nations have been unable to complete a treaty; talks are scheduled to resume in Geneva March 28, 1978.

July 20—The United Nations Security Council approves Vietnam for membership in the United Nations.

ALBANIA

July 8—The Albanian Communist party newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* carries an article criticizing the Chinese government for its rapprochement with the U.S. and for diluting Marxist-Leninist ideology.

July 26—In Peking, Chinese officials deny the charges made by Yugoslav officials that Albania asked the Chinese to withdraw Chinese technical experts following the expulsion of 50 Albanian students from Chinese universities.

ARGENTINA

July 19—In Buenos Aires, Ambassador to Venezuela Hector Hidalgo Sola, a member of the Radical party, is kidnapped.

AUSTRALIA

July 14—Governor General John Kerr submits his resignation; Zelman Cowen will replace Kerr in December.

BAHAMAS

July 20—In yesterday's parliamentary election, Progressive Liberal party leader Prime Minister Lynden O. Pindling wins 30 of 38 parliamentary seats.

CAMBODIA

July 21—Fighting is reported along the Thai-Cambodian border at Aranyaprathet; Thai forces, using tanks and armored personnel carriers and supported by fighter planes and helicopter gunships, have reportedly killed 50 Cambodian soldiers; 17 Thai soldiers have been killed.

July 26—In testimony before a U.S. House of Representatives international relations committee, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke reports that more than 1 million people have been killed in Cambodia since the Communist takeover in 1975.

CANADA

July 5—In a speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau says that the government is willing to consider constitutional changes to protect the cultural integrity of minority groups.

July 6—A 3-member commission is named to investigate charges that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police acted illegally under the guise of conducting national security investigations.

July 8—The government permits the limited use of French in the Montreal area by air traffic controllers.

July 12—In Ottawa, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt ends a week-long visit in Canada. He and Prime Minister Trudeau agree to resume Canadian shipments of uranium ore to West Europe.

CHAD

July 18—During a visit to the Ivory Coast, French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud says that earlier in the month France provided military transport planes as support cover for Chad forces fighting against Libyan-backed rebels.

CHINA

(See also *Albania*)

July 19—In Peking, wall posters announce the reinstatement of Teng Hsiao-ping to the posts of Communist party deputy chairman, Deputy Prime Minister, deputy chairman of the Military Affairs Commission and chief of staff. He was dismissed from these 4 posts in 1976 after the death of Premier Chou En-lai.

July 21—In Peking, wall posters announce the dismissal of the "Gang of Four," including Mao Tse-tung's widow Chiang Ching, from the Communist party.

July 22—The Central Committee of the Communist party officially confirms the restoration of Teng Hsiao-ping to his former post. The committee also confirms Hua Kuo-feng as party Chairman.

July 31—Defense Minister Yeh Chien-Ying says China must modernize her armed forces.

Teng Hsiao-ping attends the ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist army; this is his 1st official act since he was restored to his government posts.

ECUADOR

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

EGYPT

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 6—Former Minister of Religious Affairs Mohammed Hussein al-Zahabi is found murdered; he was kidnapped 3 days ago by members of the society for the Repentance and Flight from Sin. This extremist Muslim sect, which practices "sacred terror," was demanding the release of 60 jailed cult members in exchange for the foreign minister's release.

July 8—Shukri Ahmed Mustafa, the leader of the extremist Muslim cult, is arrested; nearly 150 cult members have been arrested this week in connection with the murder of al-Zahabi.

July 16—In Cairo, President Anwar Sadat tells the Arab Socialist Union's Central Committee that the Soviet Union is continuing to take a "hard-line policy" toward Egypt and that the Soviets have cancelled all military contracts with Egypt.

July 21—In Cairo, a radio broadcast reports heavy fighting between Egyptian and Libyan armored troops along the border at Salum and Musaad, near the Mediterranean coast. This is the 4th time in a month that the 2 countries' forces have fought. Relations have deteriorated since their 1972 merger plans fell through.

July 23—The Libyan Arab Revolution News Agency reports 4 bombing attacks by Egyptian planes, at Tobruk on the Mediterranean, at Kufra oasis in Southeast Libya, and at other "civilian targets."

A Libyan delegation reportedly goes to Moscow with

the bodies of 4 Soviet technicians who were killed in an Egyptian air raid on July 22.

July 24—Following a meeting with Algerian President Houari Boumedienne in Alexandria, President Sadat orders Egyptian forces to observe an immediate ceasefire.

July 26—In a speech at Alexandria University, President Sadat says that the fighting with Libya is over. He does not make public the list of conditions Egypt reportedly submitted to Libya.

July 29—In Paris, Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abd al-Salam Turayki says that his government has accepted the peace plan worked out by Arab negotiators. Egypt has not yet accepted the accord.

July 31—In an interview released today, President Anwar Sadat says that "alternatives" to a direct role for the PLO at a Geneva peace conference on the Middle East can be found.

EL SALVADOR

July 1—General Carlos Humberto Romero, leader of the military-supported National Conciliation party, is sworn in as President; the inaugural ceremony is boycotted by Archbishop Oscar A. Romero to protest the government's use of "torture" against Roman Catholic priests.

July 14—Former President Osmin Aguirre Salinas is shot and killed by terrorists; he ruled the country for 16 years until Romero's inauguration.

ETHIOPIA

July 9—A spokesman for the Eritrean People's Liberation Front claims that the Front has taken control of Decamere, a former training center for government troops.

July 10—The Front reports the capture of Keren, 55 miles north of Asmara.

July 18—Fighting intensifies near the eastern city of Dire-dawa between government troops and guerrillas of a secessionist organization called the Western Somali Liberation Front. Dire-dawa is a major rail link between Addis Ababa and the Red Sea.

July 27—In Addis Ababa, newspapers report that 2 Somali Soviet-made MiG-21 fighter planes have been shot down in the Ogaden region.

July 28—Somali ambassador Abdullahi Egal Nur claims that Somali forces shot down 3 Ethiopian fighter planes when they crossed the border into Somalia.

July 31—In Addis Ababa, the government reports that Somali air raids have caused heavy Ethiopian civilian casualties in the eastern Ogaden area.

FRANCE

(See also *Chad*)

July 31—30,000 antinuclear protesters clash with police at the construction site of a fast-breeder reactor at Creys-Malville, France; 1 person is killed and more than 20 are injured.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See *Canada; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

INDIA

July 4—In voting yesterday in Kashmir, the Muslim party of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah wins a majority in the 76-seat state assembly.

July 21—President K. B. Reddy is elected President by action of Parliament and the state assemblies; he ran unopposed.

IRAN(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 31—Statements published in Iranian newspapers indicate that Iran is withdrawing her request to purchase \$1.2 billion worth of airborne radar equipment from the U.S. because U.S. congressional approval for the purchase has been delayed.

ISRAEL(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 15—Prime Minister Menahem Begin leaves for Washington, D.C., for talks with U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

July 17—Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich announces the government's austerity program; it includes price increases of 25 percent and major cuts in the government's spending, including a cut of \$140 million in the defense budget.

July 22—In Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department officials announce their decision to allow the Israeli government to apply \$107 million in U.S. military aid to the production of the Chariot, a heavy tank. No agreement is reached on the proposed Israeli purchase of F-16 fighter planes.

July 27—The Knesset overwhelmingly endorses Begin's proposal to grant full legal recognition to 3 Israeli settlements on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

ITALY

July 15—In the Chamber of Deputies, for the first time in 30 years Communist party deputies vote to support a government platform; they endorse the 11-month-old Cabinet of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti.

July 26—In Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Andreotti meets with U.S. President Jimmy Carter.

JAPAN(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 11—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held for half the seats in the 252-member upper house, the House of Councillors.

July 12—Final election results give the governing Liberal-Democratic party of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda a minority role, with 124 seats in the House of Councillors. 3 conservative independents agree to support the Liberal-Democrats, thus giving them 127 seats, a bare majority in the House.

KENYA

July 20—In Nairobi, Somali Vice President Hussein Kulmia Afrah and Kenyan Vice President Daniel Arap Moi issue a joint communiqué declaring their intention to "normalize and restore tranquility" along their countries' northern border. Fighting erupted between Somali and Kenyan troops in late June when Somali guerrillas were crossing the border into Ethiopia to fight against Ethiopian troops near Diredawa.

**KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF (North)**(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)**(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Political Scandal*)

July 17—In an apparent attempt to counter the U.S. government's criticism, the government releases 14 impris-

oned political dissidents, 4 clergymen and 10 university students.

LAOS(See *Vietnam*)**LEBANON**

July 3—Despite a U.N.-arranged truce, sporadic fighting continues in southern Lebanon between right-wing Christian forces and left-wing Palestinian forces.

July 14—Following the June 30 government-imposed press censorship, government officials suspend publication of *Al Hawadess* for a week for violating the censorship rules.

July 18—Damascus radio reports an agreement between Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on a plan for peace in southern Lebanon; the proposal calls for the withdrawal of all troops from that area; the creation of a demilitarized zone, and the presence of Lebanese troops.

July 25—Lebanon and the PLO agree to the terms of the Syrian proposals for establishing peace in southern Lebanon; the proposals adhere to the 1969 "Cairo agreement" and will become effective July 30.

July 30—Under the terms of the recent peace agreement, Syrian soldiers of the Arab League's peacekeeping forces establish military positions around 2 Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila. The PLO is responsible for maintaining order in the camps. Similar arrangements are to be completed soon in the other 11 refugee camps.

LIBYA(See *Egypt*)**MALAWI**

July 7—President H. Kamuzu Banda dissolves the national executive committee and dismisses Cabinet members and all deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries. No explanation is given.

MAURITANIA

July 3—Polisario Front guerrillas attack the capital city of Nouakchott in an attempt to attract attention from African leaders meeting in Gabon. Front members were denied visas to Gabon to attend the meeting.

July 7—In Paris, Mauritania's ambassador to France is shot and wounded by 2 gunmen while he is riding in his car.

NETHERLANDS

July 15—Caretaker Prime Minister Joop M. den Uyl asks to be relieved of the responsibility to form a new government.

July 18—Caretaker Deputy Prime Minister Andreas A. M. Agt refuses to try to form a new government.

July 27—Queen Juliana again asks Prime Minister Joop den Uyl to form a coalition Cabinet. An agreement on a coalition was reportedly worked out last night among members of the Labor party, the Christian Democrats and the Democrats '66.

PAKISTAN

July 4—In a nationwide radio broadcast, Army Chief of Staff General Mohammad Ziaul-Haq announces that the armed forces have seized the government. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Cabinet members and members of the Pakistan National Alliance are taken into "tempo-

rary protective custody"; the National Assembly is dissolved, and the governors of the 4 provinces are dismissed. President Fazal Elahi Choudhry will continue to act as Head of State. All political activity is temporarily prohibited.

July 7—The new military government names civilian government workers to positions in the new government.

July 8—In his first interview since taking over the government, General Ziaul-Haq says he hopes that Bhutto will be a candidate in the October elections.

July 28—The military government releases former Prime Minister Bhutto and 15 other political leaders from jail.

PANAMA

(See U.S., Foreign Policy)

PERU

July 20—After yesterday's general strike by union members in Lima, the government arrests labor leaders. The strike was called to protest the government's June 10 austerity measures.

July 28—President Francisco Morales Bermudez announces that elections will be held next year to elect a constitutional assembly to plan for a return to civilian rule by 1980.

RHODESIA

July 1—Government security forces arrest black nationalist guerrilla leaders of the African National Council.

July 5—Ian Sandeman and 11 other right-wing white legislators who broke away from the Rhodesian Front led by Prime Minister Ian D. Smith in March form a new political party called the Rhodesian Action party. The new party is opposed to liberalizing the race relations laws and to the British proposal for the transfer of power to the black majority.

July 8—In London, members of the 35-nation Commonwealth conference establish a 10-member working committee to explore possible sanctions against the government of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith.

July 18—In a nationwide radio broadcast, Prime Minister Smith announces that he plans to dissolve Parliament immediately and to hold general elections August 31. He says that the recent proposals made by U.S. and U.K. officials are unacceptable and that he wants a mandate from the people for an internal settlement.

July 23—In Washington, D.C., U.S. President Jimmy Carter and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance confer with British Foreign Secretary David Owen on Smith's recent decision to call for general elections.

SOMALIA

(See Ethiopia; Kenya; U.S., Foreign Policy)

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also U.S., Foreign Policy)

July 15—In Pretoria, a Supreme Court judge acquits Breyten Breytenbach, a well-known Afrikaans poet, of charges of promoting anti-government terrorism from his maximum security cell in Pretoria Central Prison.

July 29—Demonstrations by blacks in Johannesburg and Pretoria suburbs end in violence when police attempt to disperse the crowds; 183 youths are arrested and 1 teenager is killed by police.

SPAIN

July 4—Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez announces the

composition of his new Cabinet; 7 officials from the previous Cabinet are retained.

July 12—The government devalues the peseta by 24.9 percent, bringing the exchange rate to 87.5 pesetas to the U.S. dollar.

July 19—King Juan Carlos issues a royal decree; during the next 3 months price increases will be restricted to increases in production costs.

July 22—King Juan Carlos addresses the opening session of the 1st freely elected Parliament in 40 years.

SRI LANKA

July 16—5 days before the general election, Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike shuts down the country's largest newspaper, part of the Lake House newspaper group.

July 22—Election returns from yesterday's general election give the opposition party, the United National party of Junius Richard Jayewardene, 138 seats in the 168-member Parliament. Prime Minister Bandaranaike's Freedom party wins only 5 seats.

July 23—Junius Richard Jayewardene is sworn in as Prime Minister.

Fighting breaks out in 8 districts between supporters of former Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Prime Minister Jayewardene. Jayewardene imposes a curfew; 34 people are killed.

July 25—The curfew is lifted as police patrol the strife-torn areas.

SUDAN

(See U.S., Foreign Policy)

THAILAND

(See Cambodia)

TURKEY

July 3—On its first vote of confidence in Parliament, the month-old government of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is defeated by a coalition of right-wing parties.

July 4—Conservative Justice party leader Suleyman Demirel is asked to form a new government.

July 21—Suleyman Demirel takes office as Prime Minister; he was able to form a coalition government made up of members of the Justice party, the Islamic nationalists of the National Salvation party and ultrarightists of the Nationalist Movement party.

UGANDA

July 4—In an address to the African summit conference in Libreville, President Idi Amin acknowledges that there was an attempt on his life last month; he blames Western imperialists for inciting the attempt.

U.S.S.R.

(See also Egypt; U.S., Foreign Policy)

July 3—Following the U.S. government's decision to cancel production of the B-1 bomber and develop the low-flying cruise missile, the Communist party newspaper *Pravda* declares that the U.S. is "... beginning a new round of the arms race ... a policy dangerous to mankind...."

July 4—In Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon is denied permission to broadcast a traditional July 4 address over Soviet television because his speech contained a reference to the U.S. policy on human rights.

July 5—According to the Soviet press agency Tass, U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon has been informed by President Leonid I. Brezhnev that "a number of aspects" of U.S. President Jimmy Carter's policy on human rights

do "not accord with the aim of a constructive development" of U.S.-Soviet relations.

July 6—An article in *Izvestia*, the government newspaper, says that the development by the U.S. of the cruise missile violates a "formula" that Brezhnev and U.S. President Richard Nixon established.

July 12—An article in Tass accuses former Moscow correspondent for the Los Angeles Times Robert C. Toth of working for unspecified "American special agencies." Toth was held for questioning last month just before leaving the Soviet Union.

July 28—NATO officials report that 89 Soviet submarines have been deployed in the North Atlantic in a display of Soviet naval power.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

July 7—Members of the Transport and General Workers Union vote to reject the government's third phase of voluntary pay restraints; they call for "unfettered collective bargaining" when the 2d stage agreement expires at the end of July.

July 11—In London, 70 demonstrators are arrested in a clash with police as 11,000 union demonstrators picket the Grunwick photograph-processing plant. The union, the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs (APEX), is demanding recognition as the bargaining agent for the employees.

July 26—The government announces that unemployment rose to 5.9 percent in mid-July.

UNITED STATES

Administration

July 3—State Department officials report that the department has asked President Jimmy Carter to approve the emergency admission of 15,000 Indochinese refugees now stranded in Southeast Asia.

July 5—Administration sources say that at a meeting in Washington, D.C., with special presidential assistant for energy affairs James Schlesinger, President Carter asked Schlesinger to prepare a comprehensive, standby gasoline-rationing program that would reduce consumption by 25 percent in case of emergency.

July 6—White House press secretary Jody Powell says that President Carter will decide around August 15 whether or not to recommend production of neutron weapons.

Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar proposes to increase first-class business mail rates to 16¢ an ounce, while allowing private individuals to mail at 13¢ an ounce.

July 8—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, Jr., discloses plans for government subsidies for families that adopt children who are hard to place otherwise because they are handicapped, ill, or belong to a minority group.

July 10—In a television interview, presidential energy adviser James Schlesinger says that the President has decided to reject a proposal to sell Alaskan pipeline oil to Japan in exchange for oil more easily shipped to the U.S. east coast.

July 11—The board of governors of the U.S. Postal Service approves the two-tier postal rate plan proposed by Postmaster General Bailar July 6; the plan goes to the Postal Rate Commission, which can hold hearings for up to 10 months on the proposal. This could delay implementation of the rate rise until May, 1978.

July 12—At a White House news conference, President Carter says the administration will support legislation raising the minimum wage 35 cents an hour to \$2.65 this

year; future increases would be based on a percentage of the average hourly manufacturing wage.

In a letter to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, President Jimmy Carter asks the committee to extend the deadline for selling National Bank of Georgia stock held by Bert Lance, head of the Office of Management and Budget, because the deadline contributed to an artificial decline in the stock's price.

July 13—Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency E. Henry Knoche resigns effective August 1.

July 14—According to White House sources, the President will extend the life of the Council on Environmental Quality as a White House agency.

July 15—At a news conference in the White House, President Carter says he plans to reorganize the White House staff and the Executive Office; the projected plan eliminates 7 agencies and adds 2; it is estimated that it will save \$6 million a year.

President Carter approves a July 3 State Department request for the emergency admission of 15,000 Indochinese refugees to the U.S.

The Central Intelligence Agency announces that recently discovered information reveals that an additional unknown number of Americans were the unknowing subjects of CIA drug experiments in the 1950's and 1960's.

July 20—According to White House sources, President Carter will propose legislation to Congress that would grant full amnesty to aliens who have been working in the U.S. for 7 years or longer; they would be allowed to send for their families.

July 21—In an interview at the White House, President Carter says that the looting occurring during the New York City blackout caused by a massive power failure on July 13 and July 14 shows that federal job, health, education and housing programs must be extended to urban areas "neglected too long."

In the disastrous flood that inundated Johnstown, Pa., July 19, the official death toll reaches 46 persons; the damage is estimated at over \$2 million and the final death toll is expected to rise sharply.

July 23—Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall outlines an administration plan to extend \$11.3 million in grants and loans to aid in New York City's recovery from the looting and vandalism that broke out during the blackout there July 13-14.

July 25—President Carter urges Congress to modify some strict provisions of the Clean Air Act before congressional recess on August 5; otherwise he fears a shutdown of the automobile industry, which will be unable to meet standards set for 1978 cars going into production in August.

July 28—At a news conference in Washington, D.C., President Carter says that critical remarks about Congress and members of his administration by leaders of minority groups damage the optimism of the underprivileged. National Urban League executive director, Vernon Jordan, Jr., criticized the administration's attitude toward the underprivileged earlier in the week.

The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Washington, D.C., overrules a lower court decision that would have required the Treasury Department to impose special duties on imported Japanese television sets.

July 29—After 38½ days, the first flow of oil in the Alaskan pipeline reaches the terminal port of Valdez.

July 31—In an interview published today, President Carter says, without giving his reasons, that New York City will not receive disaster status because of the July 13-14

blackout; the city will not receive \$11.7 million in federal reimbursement of overtime pay for police and others.

Civil Rights

July 1—The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People opens its 68th annual convention in St. Louis.

July 5—The Labor Department issues a memorandum reminding employers that, provided that they are able to perform their work, alcoholics and drug abusers are covered under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which protects handicapped people against job discrimination.

July 15—President Carter's special representative on Indian land claims recommends offering Maine's Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes \$25 million in federal funds and 100,000 acres of state lands in settlement of their claim for almost 12 million acres of Maine's land.

July 20—In Washington, D.C., the American Civil Liberties Union says that President Carter has compiled a "poor civil liberties record" since he took office 6 months ago.

July 25—Responding to criticism of his record on blacks and the poor by National Urban League President Vernon Jordan, President Carter defends his record and says he has "no apologies to make."

Economy

July 8—The Labor Department reports the unemployment rate at 7.1 percent for June.

According to the Labor Department, the wholesale price index fell 0.6 percent in June.

July 13—The Census Bureau reports that the number of poor people in the U.S., those below the poverty level of a \$5,500 annual income, increased more than 10 percent from 1974 to 1975, to about 25.9 million people, about 12 percent of the population.

July 21—The Commerce Department reports a revised figure of 6.4 percent for the GNP in the 2d quarter, and 7.5 percent in the 1st quarter of 1977.

The Labor Department reports a 0.6 percent rise in the consumer price index for June.

July 22—Bethlehem Steel Corporation announces a 6 percent increase in steel prices; this follows yesterday's announcement by the United States Steel Corporation of a 6 percent price rise.

July 27—The Commerce Department reports a record \$2.82 billion trade deficit for June.

July 29—The Commerce Department reports that the index of leading economic indicators dropped 0.6 percent in June.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Iran*)

July 1—Panamanian and U.S. negotiators on the Panama Canal meet briefly in Washington, D.C.; U.S. officials say that the U.S. is ready to offer Panama as much as \$50 million a year in tolls, pending transfer of the canal to Panama by treaty in the year 2000.

In a speech at the convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in St. Louis, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance again warns South Africa that her relations with the U.S. "will inevitably suffer" unless South Africa takes steps toward the full political participation of the blacks of South Africa.

July 6—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d cites a February 7 policy statement, saying that the U.S. is not prepared to allow Israel to sell Ecuador 24 fighter-bombers equipped with U.S. engines.

July 7—U.S. and Soviet negotiators begin talks in Geneva on a joint move to initiate an international agreement

that would outlaw the use of the most dangerous chemical weapons as a step toward a total ban on chemical weapons.

July 12—At a news conference in Washington, D.C., President Carter says that President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has agreed to withdraw some Egyptian troops from the Sinai and return the bodies of 19 Israeli soldiers killed in the 1973 war.

July 13—A U.S. Ch-47 Chinook helicopter is shot down by North Korean forces after flying over the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea; 3 crewmen are killed and a 4th is captured. President Carter says the helicopter flew over North Korea by mistake.

July 14—President Carter and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt conclude 2 days of amicable talks in Washington.

July 16—North Korea returns the bodies of the 3 dead crewmen and frees the surviving crewman of the downed helicopter.

July 18—President Carter approves the formation by the State Department of an interagency committee to coordinate U.S. policies toward the U.S.S.R.; Marshall Shulman, adviser on Soviet affairs to Secretary of State Vance, and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George Vest will cochair the committee.

July 20—At the conclusion of 2 days of conferences with Israeli Prime Minister Begin, President Carter says he is optimistic that the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East will resume in October; Begin's public statements on the Israeli position regarding the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the conference appear to bar any conference resumption.

July 21—In a speech in Charleston, South Carolina, President Carter states that the U.S. is prepared to limit strategic weapons programs if the U.S.S.R. is prepared to accept controls on its large intercontinental missiles.

July 23—Secretary of Defense Harold Brown arrives in Seoul, South Korea, to initiate talks on the planned withdrawal of about 30,000 U.S. troops from South Korea.

July 25—Defense Secretary Harold Brown presents a letter to South Korean President Chung Hee Park in which President Carter emphasizes "that our ground force withdrawal plans signify no change whatsoever in our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea."

July 26—State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says the U.S. will provide military assistance to Somalia earmarked for the defense of Somalian territory.

State Department officials say they will "consider sympathetically" any request for military aid from Chad.

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown concludes 2 days of talks with South Korean officials in Seoul; a joint communiqué is issued stating that the bulk of U.S. combat forces will remain in Korea until "the final phase of their withdrawal" in 1982.

July 27—The State Department announces that the U.S. is prepared to "contribute to the legitimate defense needs" of the Sudan and has so informed Sudan.

Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti concludes 2 days of conferences with President Jimmy Carter.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown meets with Japan's Premier Takeo Fukuda in Tokyo to discuss the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

July 28—At a news conference in Washington, D.C., President Carter says that by legalizing 3 Israeli settlements on the occupied West Bank of the Jordan River Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin has placed a further obstacle in the way of Middle East peace.

President Carter announces at his news conference that the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union will begin "formal negotiations in Geneva on October 3" on a treaty banning all underground nuclear explosions.

President Carter agrees to delay the sale of radar planes to Iran until September in order to allow Congress more time to study the proposed sale.

July 31—Secretary of State Cyrus Vance leaves for the Middle East with specific U.S. peace proposals for Middle East leaders.

Labor and Industry

(See also *Economy*)

July 17—The Federal Renegotiation Board says that the Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company billed the U.S. Navy for 117.4 million more pounds of steel than was used to fulfill its contracts; investigators estimate the overcharge at \$10.2 million. This is the board's 2d report on overcharges in this contract.

Legislation

June 11—By a 49-38 vote, the Senate rejects a proposal by President Carter to limit new funds for the Clinch River nuclear breeder reactor plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to \$33 million to complete design work and to phase out the project; by a voice vote, the Senate authorizes a compromise \$75 million, enough to allow the project to retain its current status and to continue to employ necessary personnel.

July 12—By a voice vote, the House votes to write into law the limitations on congressional franking privileges adopted in March by both House and Senate in their respective codes of ethics; if the Senate follows suit the limitations will become federal law.

July 13—By a 74-19 vote, the Senate appropriates an undisclosed sum to permit President Carter to go ahead with plans to produce a neutron bomb; he cannot use the funds until he certifies that the production of the bomb is in the national interest. Congress may then veto production by a majority vote within 45 days.

July 14—By a 227-171 vote, the House agrees to establish a 13-member select intelligence committee to control disclosure of government secrets by members of Congress; the Senate established a similar committee last year.

July 18—President Carter asks Congress to adopt proposals that would make provisions of the National Labor Relations Act "fairer, prompter and more predictable"; the changes would make it easier for workers to unionize.

July 21—By a 325-68 vote, the House approves a compromise measure already passed in the Senate, a strip-mining bill that will guarantee the reclamation of land damaged by the mining process. The bill goes to President Carter.

July 22—The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee will question Office of Management and Budget Director Bert Lance about a \$3.4 million loan he obtained in January, 1977, from the First National Bank of Chicago.

July 25—A 318-61 vote in the House and a voice vote in the Senate complete congressional action on a \$10.4-billion public works bill; as part of the compromise between the President and Congress, the \$75-million authorization for the Clinch River breeder reactor passed by the Senate on July 11 is dropped.

Military

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

July 1—Defense Secretary Harold Brown says that a saving of billions of dollars in the next 10 years and a re-

duced defense budget for next year will result from President Carter's decision to halt production of the B-1 bomber.

July 17—Representative Les Aspin (D., Wisc.) says that Pentagon estimates of rising Soviet naval strength consistently overestimate Soviet shipbuilding.

Political Scandal

July 12—G. Gordon Liddy, a Watergate conspirator, is granted an early release from jail by the U.S. Parole Commission; Liddy will be released in September on payment of a \$40,000 fine.

July 15—The special counsel to the House Ethics Committee in the investigation of the Korean bribery scandal resigns after committee chairman Representative John Flynt, Jr., (D., Ga.) criticized him publicly and called for an audit of his fees and expenses.

July 20—Former Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski is named by the House Ethics Committee to take charge of its investigation into Korean influence-buying in the U.S.

July 26—The former clerk in the office of former Speaker of the House Carl Albert (D., Okla.), Suzi Park Thomson, meets with members of the House Ethics Committee and says she has "no knowledge of any bribes or pay-offs" made to members of Congress by Korean agents.

Science and Space

July 19—The Electro Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California, sponsored by the nation's electric utilities, and the Russian Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy of Moscow sign an agreement for collaborative testing of a fusion-based power system that could also breed fuel for fission reactors now in use.

Terrorism

July 23—Hanafi Muslim leader Hamas Abdul Khaalis and 2 followers are convicted on 2d-degree murder charges, 8 counts of kidnapping and conspiracy in the 39-hour seizure of 149 hostages in 3 Washington, D.C., buildings in March, 1977; 9 other defendants are convicted on conspiracy and kidnapping charges. Khaalis is also convicted on 3 assault charges.

VENEZUELA

July 17—In a direct primary election, the Democratic Action party elects Luis Penerua Orda, party secretary-general, as its candidate for President in the upcoming 1978 presidential elections.

VIETNAM

(See also *Intl. U.N.*)

July 12—In the United Nations, the government submits a new request for membership; in May, the U.S. agreed to drop its opposition to membership for Vietnam.

July 17—In Bangkok, Laotian and Vietnamese officials sign a statement reaffirming that a "special relationship" exists between the two countries.

July 18—Representatives of Vietnam led by Communist Party Secretary General Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong sign a series of economic and military accords with Laotian representatives.

ZAMBIA

July 20—President Kenneth Kaunda dismisses Prime Minister Elijah Mudenda from office; Legal Affairs Minister Mainza Chona is named Prime Minister.



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